The period between 1923 and 1928 could be described as a period of stagnation for the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement; the 1920s were also an era of disappointment for the Zionists, as they were unable to bring more immigrants to Palestine. The Zionists had hoped to bring large numbers of immigrants during the 1920s; one of the early actions of the new civil administration under Herbert Samuel was to enact the first Immigration Ordinance on August 26, 1920, fixing a quota of 16,500 for the first year.
Between 1918 and 1920, some sixty thousand Jews died in pogroms in Europe. As late as mid-1921, more than 200,000 Jews who had fled wartime fighting or postwar hostility remained without homes. In the same year, the United States enacted an Emergency Quota Act restricting immigration, especially by Eastern European Jews. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Eastern European Jews were hoping to immigrate to Palestine. The Zionist Organization (ZO) also had to finance basic services for Jewish immigrants, including housing, schools, and healthcare. However the organization was unable to handle more than a thousand immigrants per month, far fewer than the 16,500 families that Herbert Samuel had set as the country’s economic absorptive capacity. Between 1919 and 1923 (the period known as the Third Aliyah), immigration ran to about 650 per month. 264
During the early 1920s, the mandatory administration carried out multiple projects to improve and expand Palestine’s highways, railroads, ports, and communications networks. In this process, it became one of the country’s largest employers of Jewish and Arab workers. In addition, the mandate government encouraged private investments aimed at creating strong industrial economy. As a result of these measures, the Zionists were able to bring sixty thousand immigrants to Palestine between 1924 and 1926. As noted above (page XX), subsequent waves of immigration increased the Jewish population of Palestine to 28 percent.
The leaders of the Zionist project in Palestine worked both with and against the British during the mandate years. They went on to play key roles in the government of the state of Israel, and their actions and policies had far-reaching effects into the future.
Ze’ev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky (1880–1940)
Vladimir Jabotinsky (see pages XX-XX) was born in 1880, in Odessa-Ukraine, which was part of the Russian empire. He studied in Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. He earned his law degree from the University of Rome. He was a talented journalist, a powerful speaker, and an influential leader. He joined the Zionist movement in 1903. Jabotinsky had a completely different strategy for the Zionist ideology in comparison to Weizmann’s strategy. He was antisocialist, a “bourgeois,” presenting himself as the spokesman and advocate of the middle class and their economic interests. His concept of the Jewish state was different from Weizmann’s concept: “A Jewish state on both sides of Jordan River; and social justice without class strug gle.” Rather, Jabotinsky adopted Herzl’s strategy: “A Jewish state as a prerequisite of Jewish mass settlement in Palestine.” He believed that ending the Jewish exile (galut) could be effected once a charter for the colonization of Palestine was achieved.265 His plan was for wealthy Jews to buy Palestine from the Turks. In 1903, he had extensive discussions with Vyacheslav von Plehve, Russia’s notoriously anti-Semitic minister of the interior, regarding this matter: “If the Russians would intervene with the Turks on behalf of Zionism . . . this would, at the same time, put an end to certain agitation.”266 The Russians were concerned about the involvement of the Jews in the revolutionary socialist movement. Herzl, during the Zionist congress meeting in 1903, stated that he had had a secret meeting with Chaim Zhitlovsky, a leading Russian social revolutionary, in which he told him, “I have just come from von Plehve. I have his positive, binding promise that in fifteen years, at the maximum, he will effectuate for us a charter for Palestine. But this is tied to one condition: the Jewish revolutionaries shall cease their struggle against the Russian government.” 267
Jabotinsky was convinced that the Arabs would fight anything the Zionists did in Palestine, for they understood that any Zionist success would reduce their dominance in the country. Therefore, he concluded, the Jewish national home could develop only behind an “iron wall” of combined British and Jewish force. He was certain that Arabs would try to pierce the wall, but he was equally sure that repeated failure to do so would eventually lead them to accept the Zionist project.
Jabotinsky disputed the idea that the socialist proletariat ideology was essential for the Jewish national home. Jabotinsky believed that the Zionist Organization existed for a single purpose: to enhance the physical safety of Jews threatened by the hostility of non-Jews among whom they lived. He emphasized that only when Jews became a majority in Palestine and took over the reins of government would the Zionists have accomplished their true mission. He insisted that the ZO must encourage all Jews—capitalists, laborers, and shopkeepers alike—who wanted to come to Palestine, no matter what they might contribute to the economic restructuring of the Jewish people or the augmentation of the country’s absorptive capacity. In regard to the obligations of the mandate government toward the Zionist project, he rejected the Samuel-Churchill interpretation of the mandate, including the separation of Transjordan, and insisted that Britain should place the full resources of His Majesty’s government at the ZO disposal for the purpose of creating a Jewish majority and state in Palestine on both sides of the Jordan River.
Clashes between Jabotinsky’s supporters and Weizmann’s advocates, who controlled the Zionist Organization, continued throughout the whole decade. Jabotinsky, who was elected to the ZO Executive in 1920, resigned in 1923, and subsequently organized the opposition Revisionist Party. From 1925 to 1935, Jabotinsky challenged the Weizmann labor alliance for ZO leadership. In 1935 the Revisionist Party left ZO and established the rival New Zionist Organization.
Jabotinsky’s biographers attribute to him the resurrection of Herzl’s “political Zionism.” Jabotinsky followed in Herzl’s footsteps when he negotiated with ruling circles in Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, and other states known for their anti-Jewish policies to formulate a plan for the evacuation of one million Jews from Eastern Europe. Herzl and Jabotinsky failed in their efforts to obtain a political charter. However, the “practical Zionists” under the leadership of Weizmann only succeeded in achieving their goal through obtaining a charter from Britain (i.e., the Balfour Declaration, and the incorporation of that declaration in the British man date of Palestine). This success brought a different meaning to the debate between political and practical Zionism. The main issue of all Zionists then became the best strategies to maximize Jewish immigration into Palestine.
Jabotinsky’s new contribution to Zionist doctrine was the introduction of the concept of militancy to the Zionist movement. He introduced the idea of forming a “Jewish Legion” to fight beside the Allies for the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of a “colonizing regime” as a prerequisite of Jewish mass immigration and settlement. Early in 1915, Jabotinsky met with Jewish refugees in Cairo and proposed setting up a Jewish military unit which would fight the Turks on the side of the British in Palestine. At that time, a former officer in the Russian army, Joseph Trumpldor, joined him in his project. Jabotinsky and Trumpldor approached General Maxwell, who at the time was not considering a military offensive in Palestine, and offered to use such a unit for mule transport at the Turkish front in Gallipoli. Trumpldor assembled 562 men in the Zion Mule Corps that was sent to Gallipoli. Jabotinsky then went to London to persuade the Zionist leadership to cooperate with his “Jewish Legion” idea. Although most of the Zionist leaders declined, he succeeded in 1917 in forming a unit of a few hundred Russian Jews that became known as the 38th Battalion.
While Jabotinsky was recruiting the 38th Battalion, the Zionist labor movement in Palestine—under the leadership of Ben-Gurion, who was also enthusiastic about the “Great Dream” of a Jewish army—were building up the 39th and 40th Battalions. These battalions were composed of Jewish volunteers from the USA, England, and Palestine. The three battalions, comprising almost five thousand men, arrived in Palestine between 1918 and 1919. Jabotinsky was promoting the idea that this force would garrison in Palestine after the war. The British military administration opposed this plan and demobilized the Jewish battalions.268
Jabotinsky continued to advocate for a legal Jewish military force in Palestine, even if such a force were to be under British command. However he failed to obtain British approval. On the other hand, the labor movement started to build up, illegally, the defense force called the Hagana.
Jabotinsky’s involvement in Zionist political activities in Palestine started in 1919, when the three Jewish Legion battalions were formed. In January 1919, he became a member of the Zionist Commission and head of its political department. He constantly defied and challenged Weizmann’s leadership. Most of the crucial decisions of the Zionist Organization were taken during heated and passionate debates with Jabotinsky. His goal was to conquer the established Zionist leadership from within the Zionist Commission. When he failed, he founded the Revisionist Party in 1925, which took its name from the demand that the Palestine mandate be “revised” to include both sides of the Jordan River. The political program of the Revisionist Party was based on the assumption that it would be possible to get Britain to participate actively in bringing about a Jewish majority in Palestine which would transform the National Home into a Jewish state.269 When this challenge proved unsuccessful, he resigned from the Zionist Organization and founded the New Zionist Organization (NZO) in 1935.
Among the aims and principles of the NZO were the redemption of Israel and its land, the revival of its sovereignty and language; implanting in Jewish life the sacred treasures of Jewish tradition; a Jewish state on both sides of Jordan; and social justice without class struggle in Palestine. 270
Jabotinsky tried to rally social and political forces capable of confronting the Weizmann labor coalition behind the NZO. In spite of his claim that Revisionism would and should unite all social trends in Zionism, his newspaper campaigned against the socialist parties. He supported the middle class, and praised the Jewish merchants and their role in economic progress and national commercial and social development. Jabotinsky declared, “If there is a class in whose hands the future lies, it is we: the bourgeoisie.” The Revisionists earned the reputation of being fascists due to the viciousness of their propaganda attacks against socialists and their hatred of the kibbutzim. Furthermore, some members did not conceal their sympathy toward Hitler, who was described the savior of Germany, and Mussolini, considered the political genius of Italy. 271
World War II and the Nazi Holocaust were the turning point in the conflict between the labor Zionists and the Revisionists. The Revisionists rejoined the Zionist congress in Basel in 1946, and the NZO disappeared from the scene. 272
The Revisionist position toward the Arabs is well described in Jabotinsky’s paper, “The Iron Wall,” which was published for the first time in Russia on November 4, 1923.
Emotionally, my attitude to the Arabs is the same as to all other nations— polite indifference. Politically, my attitude is determined by two principles. First of all, I consider it utterly impossible to eject the Arabs from Palestine. There will always be two nations in Palestine—which is good enough for me, provided the Jews become the majority. . . .
But it is quite another question whether it is always possible to realize a peaceful aim by peaceful means. For the answer to this question does not depend on our attitude to the Arabs; but entirely on the attitude of the Arabs to us and to Zionism. . . .
There can be no voluntary agreement between ourselves and the Palestine Arabs. Not now, nor in the prospective future. I say this with such conviction, not because I want to hurt the moderate Zionists. I do not believe that they will be hurt. Except for those who were born blind, they realized long ago that it is utterly impossible to obtain the voluntary consent of the Palestine Arabs for converting “Palestine” from an Arab country into a country with a Jewish majority.
My readers have a general idea of the history of colonization in other countries. I suggest that they consider all the precedents with which they are acquainted, and see whether there is one solitary instance of any colonization being carried on with the consent of the native population. There is no such precedent.
The native populations, civilized or uncivilized, have always stubbornly resisted the colonists, irrespective of whether they were civilized or savage Every native population, civilized or not, regards its lands as its national home, of which it is the sole master, and it wants to retain that mastery always; it will refuse to admit not only new masters but, even new partners or collaborators. . . .
There is only one thing the Zionists want, and it is that one thing that the Arabs do not want, for that is the way by which the Jews would gradually become the majority, and then a Jewish govern ment would follow automatically, and the future of the Arab mi nority would depend on the goodwill of the Jews; and a minority status is not a good thing, as the Jews themselves are never tired of pointing out. So there is no “misunderstanding.” The Zionists want only one thing, Jewish immigration; and this Jewish immigration is what the Arabs do not want. . . .
To imagine, as our Arabophiles do, that they will voluntarily consent to the realization of Zionism in return for the moral and material conveniences which the Jewish colonist brings with him, is a childish notion, which has at bottom a kind of contempt for the Arab people; it means that they despise the Arab race, which they regard as a corrupt mob that can be bought and sold, and are willing to give up their fatherland for a good railway system. . . .
We cannot offer any adequate compensation to the Palestinian Arabs in return for Palestine. And therefore, there is no likelihood of any voluntary agreement being reached. So that all those who regard such an agreement as a condition sine qua non for Zionism may as well say “non” and withdraw from Zionism.
Zionist colonization must either stop, or else proceed regardless of the native population. Which means that it can proceed and de velop only under the protection of a power that is independent of the native population—behind an iron wall, which the native population cannot breach. That is our Arab policy; not what we should be, but what it actually is, whether we admit it or not. What need, otherwise, of the Balfour Declaration? Or of the Mandate? Their value to us is that outside Power has undertaken to create in the country such con ditions of administration and security that if the native population should desire to hinder our work, they will find it impossible. . . .
In the first place, if anyone objects that this point of view is immoral, I answer: It is not true: either Zionism is moral and just, or it is immoral and unjust. But that is a question that we should have settled before we became Zionists. Actually we have settled that question, and in the affirmative. We hold that Zionism is moral and just. And since it is moral and just, justice must be done, no matter whether Joseph or Simon or Ivan or Achmet agree with it or not. There is no other morality.
In the second place, this does not mean that there cannot be any agreement with the Palestine Arabs. What is impossible is a voluntary agreement. As long as the Arabs feel that there is the least hope of get ting rid of us, they will refuse to give up this hope in return for either kind words or for bread and butter, because they are not a rabble, but a living people. And when a living people yields in matters of such a vital character it is only when there is no longer any hope of getting rid of us, because they can make no breach in the iron wall. Not till then will they drop their extremist leaders whose watchword is “Never!” And the leadership will pass to the moderate groups, who will approach us with a proposal that we should both agree to mutual concessions.
Then we may expect them to discuss honestly practical questions, such as a guarantee against Arab displacement, or equal rights for Arab citizen, or Arab national integrity. And when that happens, I am convinced that we Jews will be found ready to give them satisfactory guarantees, so that both peoples can live together in peace, like good neighbors. But the only way to obtain such an agreement is the iron wall, which is to say a strong power in Palestine that is not amenable to any Arab pressure. In other words, the only way to reach an agreement in the future is to abandon all idea of seeking an agreement at present. 273
Jabotinsky’s view of colonialism in Palestine buttressed by the “iron wall” of a strong power was not new; the British had seen the potential for a hedge against a united Arabia around the turn of the century. The homogeneity of the Middle East— the shared culture, language, history, and aspirations of the Arab people—along with its wealth of resources and its lack of geographical barriers presented a threat to colonialist aims in the absence of the Ottoman Empire. There are rumors of an international committee formed in 1907 by British prime minister Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman to study possible ways to ensure the continuity of European colonial interests. Allegedly, this committee produced a document that proposed planting a “foreign body . . . in the heart of [the Middle East] to prevent the convergence of its wings in such a way that it could exhaust its powers in never-ending wars.” Supposedly the Campbell-Bannerman document also recommended that the Western powers should promote disintegration, division, and separation in the region; establish artificial political entities that would be under the authority of the imperialist countries; and fight any kind of unity—whether intellectual, religious, or historical—and take practical measures to divide the region’s inhabitants. To achieve this, it was proposed that a “buffer state” be established in Palestine, populated by a strong foreign presence that would be hostile to its neighbors and friendly to European countries and their interests. Though the authenticity of the Campbell-Bannerman document cannot be confirmed, the historic events that followed, including the Balfour Declaration and the Sykes-Picot agreement, and the support by the British for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, would seem to corroborate its substance, or at the very least the intent behind it. 274 Jabotinsky’s views are part and parcel of the same thinking, and his Revisionists aimed to take advantage of that synchronicity.
Chaim Weizmann (1874–1952)
Chaim Weizmann (see pages XX-XX) was the Zionist movement’s principal statesman during the British mandate. In 1920 he was elected ZO president; he was the first de facto president of Israel in 1948, and was its first elected president as well, serving from 1949 to 1953. On August 14, 1929, the British authorized the establish ment of the Jewish Agency to represent, lead, and negotiate on behalf of the Jewish settler community in Palestine in all aspects of British policy. Weizmann, the first president of the agency, declared that the first phase of Jewish work had been completed and a new one was about to begin.
The birth of the Jewish Agency coincided with the beginning of the violent opposition from Palestine’s Arabs in August 1929, which started only nine days after the announcement of the establishment of the agency. Although the immediate cause of the 1929 Palestinian uprising was the dispute between the Jewish and Muslim communities over the Western Wall, the underlying reason, as the Shaw Commission’s report stated, was the Jewish immigration and land purchases that were depriving Palestinians of their livelihood.
Weizmann’s followers controlled the ZO during the 1920s. In 1931, they teamed up with Ben-Gurion’s Workers’ Party (Mapai), and the two groups managed to attract many Fourth Aliyah immigrants into institutions they controlled, especially the Histadrut (General Federation of Jewish workers). As mentioned on page XX, the Histadrut ran the country’s largest labor organization, making it difficult for immigrants seeking jobs to find employment without its assistance. In 1927, the country witnessed an economic decline which affected immigration. Immigration dropped to a very low level in 1927 (2,713 down from 33,8010 in 1925), while almost twice as many left the country as came into it.
Weizmann viewed the Palestinians as an unimportant element; he compared them to the rocks of Judea, as obstacles that had to be cleared on a difficult path. He repeatedly referred to the Palestinians as a “minor problem.” His main focus was on the triangle formed by Damascus, Mecca, and Bagdad. Besides his effort to build a strong relationship with Emir Faysal, during the period between 1918 and 1920, Weizmann tried to build relationship with the Syrian (Arab) nationalists. He met with members of the Syrian community in Cairo in 1919. He believed that if he assured the Arabs of his moderation, it would be up to the British to take care of the Palestinian problem. Weizmann believed strongly that Faysal controlled the Palestinians.
However, the Palestinian resistance to the British mandate in the 1920s prompted Weizmann to realize the importance of the Palestinian element. As early as May 1920 he developed a plan aimed at exploiting family feuds, ambitions, and personal rivalries between community leaders, frictions between Bedouins and farmers, and tensions and conflicts between Muslims and Christians and between rural and urban elements. This plan, however, failed to achieve its goals. At the same time, his vision of creating better economic conditions for the Palestinians did not materialize; on the contrary, by 1929 the peasants as well as the urban laborers were in worse circumstances than they had been previously. The British Commission of Enquiry following the disturbances revealed how serious the problem of landlessness among Arab peasants was. In response to the events and to the commission’s report, Weizmann recommended the transfer of the Arabs to other countries.
In the 1930s, Weizmann and Ben-Gurion accepted Peel’s partition plan, which called for the establishment of a Jewish state in part of Palestine and allowed massive immigration with no restrictions. Both believed that this “small state” was a first step toward colonizing all of Palestine. Weizmann accepted the partition concept as a temporary, expedient solution to serve for a single generation. He believed that Zionist cause was a fight of civilization against the desert, the struggle of progress, efficiency, health, and education against stagnation. He described Arabs as a primitive and backward people who were easily swayed by power, money, and success. They were treacherous and shifty, lacked moral values, and could not be relied upon to take a principled stand. 275
The concept of transfer of Palestinians (i.e., ethnic cleansing) was the subject of intense discussion between Weizmann and the British. He offered to raise the necessary funds for such project. In a private discussion with Britain’s prime minister Ramsay MacDonald and Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson, Weizmann suggested a roundtable conference be called with the Arabs to deal with this issue. At no time did he consider negotiating with the Palestinians themselves. Though these suggestions were not implemented, they were indicative of Weizmann’s attitude toward Palestinians.
In 1930, the Zionist movement faced a crisis when the Passfield Commission proposed slowing down Jewish immigration and calling for a legislative council. In addition, the Jewish settlements were facing economic difficulties, and the Zionist movement had difficulties recruiting new immigrants. It was at this point that Weizmann, in a tactical retreat, introduced the idea of parity (equality in government between Jews and Arabs despite their actual numbers) as an alternative to representative self-government with an Arab majority. In line with this tactical flexibility, he made a statement in a press interview opposing the demand for Jewish majority in Palestine. This statement was repudiated by the Zionist congress, which led to Weizmann’s resignation as president of the World Zionist Organization. His tactical flexibility, however, was an important factor in reversing the Passfield White Paper by MacDonald. The prime minister denied that the government was contemplating any prohibition of the acquisition of additional land by Jews, or of restricting Jewish immigration.
It is important to emphasize the following concepts that dominated Weizmann’s thinking:
- Nonrecognition of the existence of the Palestinian national entity. When Golda Meir was criticized for her widely published pronouncement that “there is no such thing as a Palestinian people,” critics failed to note that this was the cornerstone of the Zionist policy, initiated by Weizmann and faithfully carried out by Ben-Gurion and his successors. This policy was pursued despite the tenacity with which the Palestinians asserted their national identity.
- The concept of transfer of the Palestinians to other countries (ethnic cleansing). This was also another cornerstone of the Zionist strategy under the leadership of Weizmann. It was not an accident that the idea of transfer was incorporated into the Peel plan for the partition of Palestine in 1937. Weizmann’s transfer ideas were discussed directly with the Peel Commission.
- The concept of the Jewish state as a progressive society to be built on the basis of social justice and democracy. Weizmann supported the labor movement and its cooperatives and kibbutzim in opposition to capitalist elements in the Zionist movement.
David Ben-Gurion (1886–1973)
David Ben-Gurion, the first de facto prime minister of Israel, was elected prime minister from 1949 to 1953 and again from 1955 to 1963. He was the man who proclaimed the establishment of the state of Israel in his “Declaration of the Jewish State” on May 14, 1948.
Ben-Gurion was born in Plonsk, Poland. His political career started at an early age; he founded a Jewish youth club known as Ezra in December 1900. In the fall of 1905, he joined the Social-Democratic Jewish Worker’s Party Poali Zion and identified himself as a Marxist. He immigrated to Palestine in 1906 at the age of twenty. A month after his arrival, he was elected to the central committee of Poali Zion, as well as the chairmanship of the party’s platform committee. This new party witnessed heated debate between a leftist faction favoring a strictly Marxist platform, emphasizing the “class struggle,” and the opposing nationalist faction headed by Ben-Gurion, emphasizing the Zionist ideology and the “national struggle” alongside the “class struggle.” Ben-Gurion opposed Arab membership in the party and the trade unions it was to establish. He urged the enforcement of the principle of avodah ivrit (employing only Jewish workers, not Arabs) in Jewish settlements.
In the fall of 1907, Ben-Gurion left Petah-Tikvah for Galilee. He spent most of the next three years pioneering in Galilean settlements. In the Galilee, he experienced violent conflict between Arabs and Jewish settlers. In 1908, he joined an armed group acting as watchmen at Sejera. In 1909, he volunteered with the Hashomer, a force of volunteers who helped guard isolated Jewish agricultural communities.
In 1912, he began full-time study in law school in Istanbul, which was interrupted in August 1914 by the outbreak of the First World War. During his stay in Istanbul he realized the great value of Ottoman citizenship. Most of the Jews in Palestine were not Ottoman citizens; in fact, more than forty thousand of them held Russian citizenship and could not elect or be elected to legislative or administrative office. His dream was to become a citizen, in order to be elected to the mejllis as representative of the Jews. He went far in his dream, as he hoped to become a minister in the Ottoman cabinet.
The outbreak of the war created a new situation. The Ottoman government abolished the capitulations on September 9, 1914 (see page XX). Jamal Pasha was appointed as commander of the Ottoman Fourth Army, a post that made him virtual dictator over Arabia, Syria, and Palestine. Jamal began a policy of arresting, exiling, and deporting Zionist activists, fearing they were collaborating with the enemy. On March 23, 1915, Ben-Gurion and his colleague Yitzhak Ben-Zvi were deported.
Ben-Gurion spent the next three years, between 1915 and 1918, in the United States. This was a critical period of his life, as he was trying to develop his own views toward the Palestinian Arabs. In January 1918, while in the US, Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi published a book titled Palestine, Past and Present. In his chapter on population, Ben-Gurion wrote a sub-chapter entitled “The Origin of the Fellah.” Shabtai Teveth summarizes his thesis as follows.
[T]he fellahs had preserved ancient Jewish tradition through the cen turies as well as the placenames cited in the Bible, Talmud, Midrash, and The Jewish Wars of Josephus [BenGurion] had no doubt that the fellahs were descendants of the country folk who had inhabited the land at the time of the Arab conquest in the seventh century. . . . [he] anticipated their eventual “assimilation” into the Yishuv. 276
Ben-Gurion’s firm belief that Jews and fellahs were of the same blood prompted him, in 1920, to tell a visiting delegation of Poali Zion:
[T]he most important economic asset of the native population is the fellahs, the builders of the country and its laborers Under no circumstances must we touch land belonging to fellahs or worked by them They must receive help from Jewish settlement institutions, to free themselves from their dead weight of their oppressors, and to keep their land. Only if a fellah leaves his place of settlement should we offer to buy his land, at an appropriate price. [And if an effendi landowner sold land worked by fellahs] we must give the displaced tenants their own plots, and the means to cultivate such tracts more intensively. When this is impossible, the fellahs must receive land somewhere.” 277
During their stay in the US, Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi were watching the war and attempting to predict the outcome. Initially they believed that Germany and Turkey would win, and they started a recruitment campaign for a “pioneer army” known as Hehalutz. They hoped to raise at least ten thousand volunteers who would proceed to Palestine when called, and there form “Jewish legions to fight for Palestine” on Turkey’s side. This recruitment campaign failed.
In December 1917, the British army under General Allenby invaded Palestine and established a military administration. An Allied victory appeared inevitable. Ben-Gurion admitted to having miscalculated the possible outcome of the war. He also realized the value of the Balfour Declaration to the Zionist program and described it as a miracle: “The greatest state in the world has announced its official recognition of the existence of a Hebrew nation, and has committed itself to aid in the establishment of a national home in Palestine.” 278 In February 1918, he published an article in New York drawing the boundaries of the future Jewish state. He proposed that the northern border would extend to the Litani River, to include Acre and Tyre. The eastern extremity of the northern border was to extend to the Ouija Wadi, thirty kilometers south of Damascus. The southern border would run much further to the south beyond the PalestineEgypt border, to include Wadi alArish. Ben Gurion preferred to regard the southern border as a mobile frontier that would eventually be pushed into the Sinai by the expansion of Jewish settlements. The eastern border was not the Jordan River, but would extend further east to the Syrian Desert; this, too, would be a mobile frontier. 279
In this article, Ben-Gurion described his territorial aspirations for what he called the Jewish “commonwealth,” an ambiguous term that means a state. He had begun to build a political doctrine since 1915, when he emphasized the difference between static and volatile periods in history; during great upheavals, he thought, was a time of unlimited possibilities, and such moments had to be exploited. In the aftermath of the Balfour Declaration, the time had arrived. In November 1917, he wrote: “We have made a sudden leap forward. An arduous road which we had planned to travel slowly and painfully has been shortened and straightened as if by a miracle, and we stand on the threshold of fulfillment.” 280
The accelerated changes on the world political scene forced Ben-Gurion to clarify his position on the Palestinian Arabs’ rights. In his view, the rights of the Jews in Palestine were based on two pillars: the right established by Jewish needs—the solution for any homeless people should and must be a homeland in its historical birthplace—and the right earned by creativity and work, the conviction that a land belongs to those willing and able to develop it. He did not emphasize the claim of the historical rights of a people to the land of its ancient forefathers.
As for the Arabs, they had rights to those lands on which they lived and which they cultivated. But since they were incapable of reviving the land and restoring it from ruin, and cultivated only 20 percent of the country, the Jews had full rights to settle on the remnant. The Arabs had full rights to an independent economic, cultural, and communal life, but they did not have the right to rule the country. The future sovereignty of the country would be the right of the Jews alone.
In August 1918, Ben-Gurion arrived in Egypt from the US as a volunteer in one of the Jewish battalions. Shortly after his arrival, the battalion was joined by volunteers from Palestine, among them Berl Katznelson. Together they founded the new party Ahdut Haavodah (United Labor), which comprised most of the right wing of Poali Zion and the nonpartisan agricultural workers. The official, published aim of the new party was the establishment of a “workers’ commonwealth” in Palestine. The secret aim was the creation of a socialist Jewish state. In 1918 there were only 58,000 Jews in Palestine and Transjordan, and over a million Arabs, so it was too early to demand a state. The Zionists’ first task had to be the creation of a Jewish majority through large-scale immigration and settlement.
In 1920, Ben-Gurion assisted and subsequently became the general secretary of the Histadrut. In 1930, Hapoel Hatzair and Ahdut Haavodah joined forces to cre ate Mapai, the Zionist labor party, under BenGurion’s leadership. Ben-Gurion became involved in international Zionist politics in 1933, when he was elected to the Jewish Agency and the Zionist Executive. And in 1935 he became the chairman of the executive committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, a post he kept until the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.
Comparing Ben-Gurion and Weizmann
There were a number of differences between Ben-Gurion and Weizmann, representing variations in emphasis but not in strategy. Ben-Gurion was elected to the Zionist Executive during the most dynamic period of the Zionist movement in Palestine. During the years from 1933 to 1935, immigration was high, promising the achievement of numerical parity with the Arabs in a relatively short time. Weizmann, on the other hand, formulated his basic strategy during a period when Zionism was weak. During the 1920s, the Zionist project was dependent on the moral, financial, and political support of the Zionist movement and leadership abroad, especially in London. In the late 1920s and the 1930s, the center of gravity moved from London to Jerusalem.
Weizmann lived and operated in the circles of the British political elite. He was a statesman without a party, the spokesman for the world Jewry whose unique position was due to his intellect, political insight, charm, and diplomacy. Ben-Gurion was a militant trade unionist and labor politician who rose to prominence through sharp conflicts. He was a power-oriented politician. As the leader of the labor party, he aimed for the leadership of the working class; as the general secretary of the Histadrut, he aimed at establishing the power of the labor movement; and as chairman of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, he prepared the Jews to become the decisive factor in the Zionist movement. 281
Despite the contrasting personalities of the two Zionist leaders, Ben-Gurion agreed with Weizmann’s basic strategic concepts. Ben-Gurion believed that only through steady constructive work would the Jews be able to build an economic, political, and military force capable of creating the Jewish state. He also believed that an alliance between the Zionist movement and a great power was vital for its success. Ben-Gurion supported Weizmann’s views that cooperating with the British was essential for the achievement of the Zionist goals. In the late 1920s, the labor movement was not represented in the Zionist Executive, and it opposed unconditional cooperation with the mandatory government. The labor Zionist leaders had reservations and criticism regarding Weizmann’s position. Ben-Gurion supported Weizmann, and justified and defended Zionist cooperation with Great Britain. However, in the 1940s he realized that Great Britain’s power in the Middle East was declining, and saw the emergence of the United States as a global superpower, and so he switched the alignment of the Zionist movement from Great Britain to the United States.
Ben-Gurion also shared Weizmann’s opinion of the Arabs:
From the point of view of mentality, social outlook, public spiritedness and many other aspects, there is a marked difference and inequality between the two peoples. There is a difference between a nation living in the twentieth century, and people living in the fifteenth century, some of them in the seventh century. 282
Although we were an Oriental people, we had been Europeanized and we wished to return to Palestine in the geographical sense only. We intended to establish a European culture here, and we were linked to the greatest cultural force in the world. 283
Like Weizmann, Ben-Gurion refused to recognize the Palestinian Arabs as a major party to the Arab-Jewish conflict. Rather, he viewed the problem as a confrontation between the Jewish nation and the Arab nation stretching over a vast territory from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. The ingathering of the Jewish nation into a small patch of Arab territory would not impede the realization of Arab unity in a sovereign state of their own. He stated:
Jewish immigration could not endanger the social, political or national status of the Arabs, who in Eretz Israel constituted only a small part of a large and decisive community in this part of the world. Looking at the issues of the Palestinian Arabs from an overall Arab viewpoint, this was merely a question of a land less than 2% of the total area occupied by the Arabs in the east, and containing 3% of the total number of Arabs in the world. 284
Ben-Gurion formed his image of the Palestinian Arabs as an implacable and hostile enemy. His assessment of the Arab revolt of 1936–1939 is summarized in his speech at the Mapai political committee in 1938:
It is a national war declared upon us by the Arabs . . . This is an active resistance by the Palestinians to what they regard as a usurpation of their homeland by the Jews—that’s why they fight From the time of Sheikh Izz aldin alQassam it was clear to me that we were facing a new phenomenon among the Arabs. This is not Nashashibi, not the mufti, not a matter of a political career or money. Sheikh alQassam was a zealot ready to sacrifice his life for an ideal. Today we have not one, but hundreds, perhaps thousands [like him] A people which fights against the usurpation of its land will not tire so easily it is easier for them to continue the war and not get tired than it is for us . . . But the fighting is only one aspect of the conflict which is in essence a political one. And politically we are the aggressors and they defend themselves The land, the villages, the mountains, the roads are in their hands. The country is theirs, because they inhabit it; whereas we want to come here and settle down, and in their view we want to take their country. 285
This accurate assessment of the deep-rooted character of the Arab revolt led him to a more militant position advocating the build up of Jewish military strength to confront the Arabs rather than serious negotiations for a solution. His contacts with the Arabs subsequent to his ascendancy to the Zionist leadership aimed at building up more fear among the Arabs. He believed that such fear might serve as a stimulus and an incentive for a temporary and tactical agreement. To achieve this goal he met with several Arab leaders throughout 1934–1936, including Auni Abdel Hadi, Musa Alami, George Antonius, and Shakib Arslan. In these meetings, he demanded that they accept a Jewish state in all of Palestine including Transjordan, and Jewish settlement in Syria and Iraq, in return for Zionist support for the establishment of an Arab federation that would include Palestine.
In a letter to the Jewish Agency Executive in June, 1936, he stated his position: “Only after total despair on the part of the Arabs, as a consequence of our growth in the country, may the Arabs finally acquiesce in a Jewish Eretz Israel.” In a speech to the Jewish Agency Executive in October 1939, Ben-Gurion said: “There is no example in history that a nation opens the gates of its country, because of necessity . . . but because the nation which wants to come in has explained its desire to it. I believe that an agreement will be reached when our power grows.” 286 These statements indicate clearly that Ben-Gurion’s position and views of the Palestinian Arabs were similar to Jabotinsky’s “iron wall” concept.