Chapter 16: The British Occupation of Palestine

British forces captured Jerusalem from the Ottomans on December 9, 1917. The cities of Gaza, Hebron, Jaffa, and Bethlehem had fallen earlier. General Allenby established a provisional military administration for Palestine in December 1917, which lasted until July 1920, when the victorious allies reached a general agreement over the destinies of the areas of the former Ottoman Empire (the San Remo Agreement), long after the end of military operations in early October 1918.

General Allenby delegated the responsibility for the administration of the occupied area of southern Palestine to the chief political officer attached to the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, Brigadier­General G. F. Clayton, head of the famous “Arab Bureau” which coordinated political intelligence in the Middle East during World War I. Military governors were appointed in all the major towns of Palestine as they were captured.

The British take Political Control

On the eve of the complete occupation of Palestine in autumn of 1918, the political control was in the hands of older notables, many of them Ottomanists and strong opponents of Sharif Husayn and his sons Faysal, Abdullah, and Ali. Arab nationalists were in the minority and had no political power. After the war, Arab nationalism became the prevailing ideology. The older generation of Palestinian notables, seeing Palestine put under a separate military administration, and alarmed by Britain’s Zionist policy, adopted Palestinian nationalism over Arab nationalism. They chose to focus on Palestine and the Palestinian struggle against Zionism.

Realizing that the British were now the new authority in Palestine, many of the urban notables hoped to land important administrative posts. The mayor of Nablus under the Ottomans, Omar Zu’ayter, formed a local government in Nablus upon British request in the fall of 1918. Musa Kazim al­Husayni, accepting appointment as mayor of Jerusalem after the death of his brother Husayn al­Husayni, refrained from demonstrating against Zionism after Jerusalem’s governor, Ronald Storrs (who served in that post from 1917 to 1926), told him that he must make a choice between politics and the mayoralty. The mufti of Jerusalem, Kamil al­Husayni, whose appointment by the Ottomans had been confirmed by the British, refrained from public attacks against Zionism throughout 1918. The general administrator of the Awqaf, Arif Hikmat al­Nashashibi, also chose administration over politics when he was asked by Storrs to choose between the two. 167

In April 1918 a full-fledged Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA) was formed. Major General Sir Arthur Money was appointed chief administrator, while Clayton remained as chief political officer, taking his orders from the Foreign Office, being responsible directly to Allenby. The administration contained only a few officials who had served in previous military administrations. Allenby gave his orders to the British officials in Palestine to “maintain as far as possible the Turkish system of government and to utilize the existing machinery.” They were also instructed not to undertake any political propaganda or take part in any political questions; their job was to maintain public order and security. 168

The military government devoted its efforts to import food from Egypt to alleviate the terrible famine which hit the land in late 1917. The currency, which was worthless when the British arrived, was restored by the integration of Palestine into the Egyptian money system. Units of the Royal Engineers piped water into Jerusalem for the first time in history. An efficient, uncorrupt administrative and judicial apparatus replaced the backward, arbitrary Turkish regime.

Britain and the Zionists

As the struggle between Arabs and Zionists intensified, British officials in Palestine were inevitably drawn into situations demanding the exercise of political judgment and political decision. Money declared in an official report: “The Jews were, as a class, inferior morally and intellectually to the bulk of the Muslim and Christian inhabitants of the country.”169 Naturally, then, he opposed the implementation of a pro-Zionist policy in Palestine. Clayton shared the views of the high commissioner in Egypt, Sir Reginald Wingate. He felt a certain personal commitment to the Anglo-Arab alliance, which he believed was endangered by British sponsorship of Zionism. As early as November 28, 1917, in a telegram to the Foreign Office, Clayton referred to Arab dismay at the Balfour Declaration. After the British conquest of Jerusalem, he wrote a private letter to Mark Sykes stating his misgivings regarding Britain’s pro-Zionist policy: “I am not fully aware of the weight which Zionists carry, especially in America and Russia, and of the consequent necessity of giving them everything for which they ask . . . We have to consider whether the situation demands out and out support of Zionism at the risk of alienating the Arabs at a critical moment.” In a private letter to Wingate in April 1918 he stated: “I am very anxious that the Foreign Office should leave the execution of the policy to us here, in so far as regards Palestine itself, and not rush us. Indeed, as far as I personally am concerned, I do not propose to be rushed and would rather chuck it and let them choose someone else. I cannot conscientiously carry out any line of policy which will go against our pledges to the Arabs, and I can always return to Egypt.” He also wrote to the Foreign Office: “The British officials of the Military Administration have been fully informed of the Zionist Program and of the intention of H.M.G. regarding it. It is inevitable, however, that they should experience some difficulties in consequence of the fact that up to date our policy has been directed towards securing Arab sympathy in view of our Arab commitments. It is not easy, therefore to switch over to Zionism all at once in the face of a considerable degree of Arab distrust and suspicion.” 170

The views of Money and Clayton represented the general opinion of OETA, which was anti-Zionist and became strongly so as time went on. The accentuation of the Arab-Jewish conflict, the continuation of the British government’s pro-Zionist policy, and the failure of the military government to influence London in a contrary direction, all contributed to anti-Zionist feeling among the British in Palestine. The direc­tor of military intelligence, after a visit to Palestine, reported: “The British officials and Soldiers in Palestine were unanimous in expressing their dislike of any policy favoring the Jews, and serious fear of the consequences of such a policy.” 171

In March 1918, Weizmann arrived in the Middle East at the head of the Zionist Commission. The commission had a semi­official status, as it carried the blessing and active cooperation of the British government. The commission’s objectives, as officially defined by the British government, were “to carry out, subject to General Allenby’s authority, any steps required to give effect to the Government’s dec­ laration in favor of establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” The two important functions of the commission were “to form a link between the British authorities and the Jewish population of Palestine” and “to help in establishing friendly relations with the Arabs and other non-Jewish communities.” 172 On the day of his first meeting with Weizmann, Money expressed his suspicions of Zionist motives in his diary. The root cause of British-Zionist discord in Palestine was disagreement over the nature and significance of Arab opposition to Zionism and over the conclusions to be drawn from it. He wrote:

The Zionists in general tended to regard Arab opposition to Zionism as “artificial agitation” fomented by self-interested, corrupt, and exploitative class of landowning “effendis,” who by nature of religio-nationalist mystification and illicit socioeconomic pressure forced the ignorant fellahin into anti-Zionism which conflicted with the “real” inclinations and interests of the downtrodden peasantry. [In their view,] the true interest of the Palestine Arabs lay in cooperation with the Zionists, since the Zionists alone were capable of developing the country to the benefit of all its inhabitants. In the end, the “feudal” power of the “effendis” must be and would be broken, and then the Arab masses would overcome their present subjugated condition, and, their eyes opened by the beneficent results of Zionist development, they would realize the desirability of co-operation with the Zionists. 173

Zionists believed the British should prioritize the establishment of the Jewish national home, and this object should be pursued irrespective of any opposition. British officials in the Middle East, however, did not accept that Arab opposition to Zionism was “artificial.” They tended to regard the pro-Zionist policy of the British government as endangering the British position throughout the Muslim world. Consequently, they felt the Zionists should moderate their program and abandon provocative talk of a Jewish state in Palestine, postpone their plans for large-scale immigration and land purchases, display less arrogance in their relations with Arabs, and in general maintain a low profile in Palestine. The British officials in Palestine insisted that the Zionists must come to terms with the Palestinian Arab notable elite and with the Sherifian nationalists before any progress toward the fulfillment of the Zionist design could be contemplated. 174

In Cairo, en route to Palestine, Wingate had warned the commission that the Arabs were nervous and suspicious of Zionist aims. He urged Weizmann to meet with nationalist Syrian notables who were in exile in Cairo. For his part, Weizmann denied that the Zionists wished to establish a Jewish state in Palestine immediately after the war, and emphasized that the Zionists’ immediate objective was “a British Palestine which would act fairly and justly to all groups which inhabit the country.”

In Jerusalem, Storrs held an official reception and a dinner in honor of the Commission that was attended by the city’s leading Muslim and Christian religious and lay dignitaries. At the dinner, Storrs invited Weizmann to clear away “misconceptions and misapprehensions” concerning the aims of Zionist policy. Weizmann responded with a speech on the theme of Judeo-Arabic kinship. After Storrs rendered a summary of the speech in Arabic, the mufti of Jerusalem, Kamel al-Husayni, thanked Weizmann for his explanation, and expressed his complete confidence in the useful cooperation of all parties.

On May 8, 1918, the military governor of the Jaffa district arranged for a meeting attended by the heads of the Muslim and Christian communities. Weizmann repeated the speech he had made in Jerusalem, but received a very different response from Sheikh Ragheb Dajani, the Qadi ash Shari’a (judge of the Muslim religious court), who spoke “on behalf of both Christians and Muslims.” Clayton commented in his report to the Foreign Office: “There was an undercurrent of antagonism in the Qadi’s reply.” 175

In the fall of 1918, a memorandum by the Jaffa Muslim­Christian Association was submitted to General Allenby, in which Allenby was reminded that Britain had entered the war in order to liberate weak nations and grant them autonomy. It went on to say that the Muslims in Palestine, along with their Christian brethren, did not wish to drive anyone away from the country, and desired to live in freedom, safeguarding their own language and rights and the right of those inhabiting their homeland. The memorandum affirmed that the Palestinian Arabs rejected the Zionist project and refuted the Zionists’ claim that the Jews were returning to Palestine after an absence of twenty centuries. They clearly expressed their fear of Jewish domination. 176

Zionist Activism

The first sign of violent conflict appeared on November 2, 1918, just three days after the Turkish Armistice was signed. The Zionist Commission in Jerusalem arranged a grand ceremony to celebrate the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. The meeting was held with the approval of Storrs, the military governor, who himself addressed the large crowd. As the Jewish crowd dispersed, some scuffles broke out near the Jaffa gate. Two Palestinian Arabs, a Muslim and a Christian, were arrested, accused of beating a Jew who was carrying a Zionist banner. The following morning, a deputation of all Christian and Muslim sects, headed by the mayor, arrived at the governor’s office and handed a written protest to Storrs. It stated, in part:

The undersigned inhabitants of Jerusalem, speaking for themselves and on behalf of all the Arabs, Muslims, and Christians living in Palestine, beg to state: We have noticed yesterday a large crowd of Jews carrying banners and over running the streets shouting . . . that Palestine . . . which has been inhabited by the Arabs for long ages is now a national home for them We Arabs, Muslim and Christian, have always sympathized with the persecuted Jews in their misfortunes in other countries But there is a wide difference between this sympathy and the acceptance of such nation in our country, to be made by them a national home, ruling over us and disposing of our affairs. 177

This incident made it clear to British officials that the Balfour Declaration was both understood and opposed. Anti-Zionism now unified the Muslim and Christian communities; opposition to Zionism became the single most important agent in the growth of Arab nationalism in Palestine. 178

On November 8, 1918, the British and French governments issued their joint declaration promising self-determination and national government to the population of the occupied areas of the Ottoman Empire. The declaration was given wide publicity throughout Syria and Palestine. Storrs reported that, on the day following the announcement of the declaration, a large deputation of Muslims and Christians who had received copies of the declaration came to his office, asking whether the declaration applied to the inhabitants of Palestine, whether they had the right to choose their own future, and if not, why the notices were sent to them at all. The deputation subsequently arranged reciprocal visits to churches and mosques to demonstrate their solidarity and to declare to the world their acceptance of the Anglo-French Declaration and their desire for a Sharifian government. Later, Storrs learned that the order for the publication in Jerusalem had been issued by mistake. But what had been said could not be unsaid without provoking further unrest.” 179 Britain had resorted to various deceptive declarations aimed at assuring the Arabs during the war, and even during the negotiations at the peace conference in 1919.

Arab Opposition to Zionist Activities

The first expression of organized Arab opposition to the Balfour Declaration occurred in the winter of 1918–1919. Following the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918, a Christian Muslim Arab Committee was formed in Jerusalem. By the spring of 1919, Muslim-Christian Associations had been formed in several towns with the objects of opposing Zionism and demanding government by al-Husayn bin Ali, the sharif of Mecca (and king of the Hijaz). Such groups sprang up in all major towns, comprising members from leading Muslim and Christian notable families.

In December 1918, Money returned to England for four months on leave; while there, he met with Curzon in the Foreign Office and presented his views. Curzon endorsed the views of Money and Allenby—i.e., that Britain should slow down the Zionist aspirations, and that a Jewish government in any form would mean an Arab uprising—but he was overruled by Balfour.

Arab unrest reached a climax in early April 1919, when the Jewish festival of Passover coincided with the Nabi Musa, an annual Muslim festival involving trav­ eling from Jerusalem to the supposed tomb of Moses (Nebi Musa) in the Judean desert near Jericho. The military government barred the entrance of Jewish activists to the old city of Jerusalem as a precautionary measure in order to avoid provocations. During that period, the King-Crane Commission was expected to arrive in Palestine, which produced an immediate relaxation of the political atmosphere there. The Muslim-Christian Association and other nationalist groups agreed to present to the commission three basic demands: First, the unification of Palestine with Syria; second, an independent Arab national government; and third, the repudiation of Zionism and the ideology of the Jewish national home.

Before the King-Crane Commission arrived in Palestine, Money made a final attempt to persuade the British government to change its pro-Zionist policy. In a memorandum to Clayton subsequently forwarded to the Foreign Office, he declared: “The Palestinians in fact desire Palestine for themselves; and have no intention of allowing their coun­ try to be thrown open to hordes of Jews from Eastern and Central Europe.” He cautioned Britain of the consequences of continued adherence to the Balfour Declaration:

1. Adherence to the Zionist program by Great Britain alone will inevitably result in Commission receiving an expression of feeling adverse to a British mandate;
2. Whatever may be the mandatory power, the application of even a moderate Zionist program can only be carried through by force and in opposition to the majority of the population.

Although the memorandum was endorsed by Clayton, it fell on deaf ears in London. Curzon’s reply reminded Money that Britain was committed to supporting Zionism and that Zionist aspirations had been endorsed by the Italian, French, and US governments. 180

When the King-Crane Commission arrived in June 1919, the Muslim-Christian Associations and other Palestinian groups in all towns adhered to their three demands.

The British officials, in their contacts with the commission during its visit to Palestine, expressed almost unanimous opposition to Zionism. At a dinner for the commission on June 16, 1919, Money told one of the technical experts attached to the commission that he believed the Balfour Declaration to have been “a mistake.” As previously noted (page XX), the commission’s report recommended a unified mandate for the entirety of geographic Syria, including Palestine, with the man­ date to be handed to the United States—or, failing American acceptance, to Great Britain (rather than France). The report strongly recommended the reduction of the Zionist program, emphasizing that the Arabs of Palestine who had given evi­ dence were hostile to it and the Zionists sought to displace the non­Jewish inhabi­ tants of Palestine in a gross violation of their rights. But the commission’s report was shelved by the American government, and no notice was taken of it by the British or French. In 1922, President Wilson, on being approached for permission to make its contents known, finally authorized publication. 181

In July 1919, Money and Clayton resigned their positions in the OETA. In his resignation letter, Money stated that he was resigning for private reasons; however, in March 1919, he wrote:

I warned both Foreign Office and War Office many times as to what would follow if they encouraged Zionist pretension too far . . . I must confess my own inclination is on the side of the Arabs, though in my position I have to be absolutely impartial, and am if anything impelled by orders from home to assist the Zionists. I don’t mean, however, to be impelled very far in that direction, as it will mean practically a revolution, irrespective of the merits of the case, and if I am pressed further than I consider legitimate or judicious I shall resign. 182

On May 20, 1919, Money wrote: “I meant try to get out of this country directly; the King-Crane Commission have completed their work here. Twenty-two and half years’ service east of Suez out of thirty-four years’ service, I consider my fair share of Eastern service.” In a letter dated June 9, 1919, he wrote: “I am the more inclined to go since I see every project of the edifice I have built with some labour being pulled down by Messers Balfour, Lloyd George, and their long-nosed friends.” 183

Zionist Influence on the Home Office

The appointment of successors to Money and Clayton provided an opportunity for the Zionists to influence the decision makers to choose new British officials whom they could trust. Colonel Ronald Storrs, who had served as acting chief administrator while Money was on leave, was the obvious choice; however, he did not get the job, as he was not trusted by Weizmann. Major General Sir Harry Watson was made chief administrator on a temporary basis until November 1919. Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen succeeded Clayton as chief political officer, which pleased the Zionists. In June 1919, Allenby appointed Colonel B. H. Water­Taylor chief of staff in charge of OETA; this appointment was intended to balance that of the pro-Zionist Meinertzhagen.

In a memorandum written shortly after his appointment, Watson declared: “I would most emphatically say that unless a very limited program for the Jews’ National Home be started in the first instance, the Mandatory Power will not only have to keep for many years a large force of troops in the country, but will lose the lives of many of her sons in a war which will be fought against the principles of the League of Nations.”184 On the other hand, Meinertzhagen declared:” I do not approach Zionism in Palestine with an open mind, but one strongly prejudiced in its favor.”

In October 1919, Curzon succeeded pro-Zionist Balfour as foreign secre- tary. Although personally opposed to Zionism, Curzon regarded the Balfour Declaration as a binding commitment upon Britain, and therefore did not pro­ pose a reversal of British policy. In December 1919, General Watson was succeeded by General Louis Bols. Weizmann was not pleased by this appointment; he wrote to Herbert Samuel: “Bols has not been friendly with us in the past . . . He needs careful handling.” 185

In July 1919, US court justice Louis Brandeis, who had been instrumental in obtaining the Balfour Declaration in return for bringing the United States into the war on the side of the Allies, visited British Military Headquarters on the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem. He is reported to have told General Louis Bols that ordinances of the military authorities should be submitted to the Zionist Commission. The general’s aide-de-camp replied: “For a government to do that would be to derogate its position. As a lawyer you realize this.” But Brandeis replied: “It must be understood that the British government is committed to the support of the Zionist cause. Unless this accepted as a guiding principle, I shall report it to the Foreign Office.” Apparently, this was too much for General Bols to take. In March 1920, he complained to London, “My own authority and that of every department of my Administration is claimed or impinged upon by the Zionist Commission, and I am definitely of opinion that this state of affairs cannot continue without grave danger to the public peace and to the prejudice of my Administration.” 186

Bols then warned, “It is no use saying to the Muslim and Christian elements of the population that our declaration as to the maintenance of the status quo on our entry into Jerusalem has been observed It is manifestly impossible to please partisans who critically claim nothing more than a ‘National Home’ but in reality will be satisfied with nothing less than a Jewish state and all that it politically implies.”

Political tensions in Palestine intensified as a result of several factors, including the assumption of the Zionist Commission by Menachen Ussiskin, who adopted uncompromising attitude toward OETA and the Arabs. At the same time, there was an increase in Arab nationalist activity, manifested by the meeting of the First Palestine Arab Congress in Haifa on November 27, 1919. By early spring 1920, interracial tensions in Palestine were at a breaking point.

The Muslim-Christian Association announced that they intended to hold a demonstration on February 27, 1920. The government decided not to ban it, but on February 25, Storrs met the president of the association, Aref Pasha Dajani, and warned him that order must be strictly preserved, and that there was to be no shooting in the air or fireworks. Aref Pasha gave the required assurances. On February 26, the nationalist newspaper Suriyya al-Janobiyya printed a call to participate in the demonstration, emphasizing in the strongest terms that it must be peaceful, orderly, and disciplined. The demonstration took place on the following day. Banners were displayed bearing slogans against Zionism. A written statement was presented to Storrs who was cheered when he walked through the crowd.

On March 7, 1920, a second demonstration was held after the General Syrian Congress in Damascus had proclaimed Faysal as king of an independent Greater Syria. As the Muslim-Christian Association was preparing for a third one, General Bols summoned the Arab leadership, including Aref Dajani and the editor of Suriyya al-Janobiyya on March 12, and told them that he was issuing a proclamation prohibiting further demonstrations. Bols added that their demands for union with Syria might be more effective if conducted peacefully.

In a series of cables to the Foreign Office, Bols urged that Britain should rec­ ognize Faysal as “overlord” of Palestine. The proposal was rejected immediately by Curzon. But Allenby and the OETA continued to press the idea. The proposal appears to have arisen in the mind of Colonel Waters­Taylor, who had met Faysal in Beirut early in 1920, after the latter’s return from Europe. Waters­Taylor advised Faysal to insist on an “undivided” Syria, in which Britain would recognize him as “overlord” of the entire Fertile Crescent while maintaining British military ad­ ministration of Mesopotamia and Palestine. When Allenby continued to press for the adoption of this recognition, Curzon responded: “We think there must be a misunderstanding . . . How would recognition of Faysal as king be reconcilable with Zionist claims?” 187

The Zionists were upset by the wide spread of the Arab nationalist activities, and began to feel that they could not rely on the government to protect them. Their fears increased after attacks on settlers in northeast Galilee that resulted in the death of one of their leaders, Joseph Trumpeldor. At the end of March 1920, representatives of a “Jewish Self-Defense League” demanded of the British government the right to bear arms to protect the Jewish community during the coming Nebi Musa festivals. Storrs, on behalf of the government, rejected their request, but promised to provide the required protection. Vladimir Jabotinsky and Pinhas Rutenberg began orga- nizing the collection of arms and secret military training. By the end of March, six hundred men were performing drills daily in Jerusalem. 188

On April 2, 1920, Storrs warned the Arab leaders, including Aref Dajani and Jamal al­Husayni, that there must be no violence during the Nebi Musa religious festival. Aref Dajani instructed the participants in the festival to be peaceful and keep it a religious feast, rather than turning it into national festival.

The Nebi Musa Disturbance

On April 4, 1920, the Nebi Musa procession took place. As usual, it was led by a government band. Pilgrims came from all over Palestine. In Damascus, when the Syrian Congress proclaimed Greater Syria an independent state and Faysal its king, the crowd became excited and turned the religious festival into a national demon- stration. The Arab leadership tried hard to fulfill their promise to Storrs to keep the religious procession peaceful, but failed. The Arab rioters began to attack the Jewish quarter in Jerusalem. During four days of bloodshed, nine people died, five of them Jews; and 244 were wounded, 211 of them Jews. A few of the rioters were shot by armed Jews on rooftops. When the violence at last subsided on April 8, the Zionist leaders demanded the dismissal of Bols and Storrs. They accused them of being aware of the preparation of what they called a “pogrom,” and claimed that not only had they not tried to prevent it, but had encouraged it. The military government resented the charges made against them by the Zionists, and what they stated to the committee of inquiry, set up to investigate the riots, that they regarded the malignant activities of the Zionist Commission had provoked the Arabs’ hostility. Shortly after the riots, Bols dispatched to Allenby a report denouncing the hostile, critical, and abusive attitude of the Zionists toward the OETA. Bols accordingly urged the imme- diate abolition of the Zionist Commission. 189

The British military administration in Palestine broke off almost all contact with the Zionist Commission. The acting secretary of the commission, Max Nurock, was arrested. The commission’s cables and all Zionist publications were subject to censorship. The convening of a “Jewish Constituent Assembly” elected by the Yishuv was prohibited by the authorities. A military court sentenced Jabotinsky to fifteen years’ imprisonment (he was subsequently given amnesty in response to public outcry). Extensive arms searches were conducted in Jerusalem. 190

At the same time, stringent security precautions were taken by the military government to avoid a recurrence of violence. On April 15, General Bols issued a stern proclamation, which he read to a gathering of the heads of all communities: “I have brought you together today to make sure it is clear to you that in this country there is only one authority and that authority is myself. I am supported by a military force that can crush any disturbance of the peace, and I tell you that in future I shall use these strong forces without restraint.” 191 Storrs dismissed the pro­nationalist mayor of Jerusalem, Musa Kazim Pasha al­Husayni, and replaced him with the head of the rival notable family, Ragheb Bey Nashashibi, who was more pliant. The government halted the Arab nationalist plan to convene a Palestinian Congress at the same time as the projected Jewish Constituent Assembly. Aref al­Aref and Hajj Amin al­Husayni (who both fled to Syria) were sentenced in their absence to ten years’ imprisonment on charges of fomenting the riots.

Despite these measures, nationalist and anti-Zionist activity continued at a high level, inspired by the apparent success of the Damascus regime’s declaration of independence (see page XX). In Jaffa, Arab nationalist slogans were posted on walls. In Nablus, the local Muslim-Christian Association presented the military governor with a protest against Zionism and the impending British mandate. Arabs stoned Orthodox Jews at the Western Wall in Jerusalem. Despite Jewish fears that violence might ensue at the Muslim pilgrim festival of Nebi Saleh at Ramleh in June 1920, the feast passed peacefully.

The strength of the nationalist movement was affected badly by growing doubts and divisions within Arab ranks. Ragheb Bey Nashashibi’s acceptance of the mayoralty in succession to Musa Kazim Pasha al-Husayni highlighted the feud between supporters of the two rival families. Quarrels were reported among nationalist Arabs over whether violence should be employed against Zionism: Kamel Budeiri (longtime Arab independence activist and publisher of the Al Sabah newspaper) advocated further use of force; while Aref al-Aref (journalist, historian, and politician who was mayor of East Jerusalem in the 1950s) opposed it. 192

The Foreign Office in London was inclined to accept the Zionist allegations that OETA was biased against their cause, and the continued existence of the military administration was called into question. The position of the military government was further undermined by a dispatch to the Foreign Office from chief political officer Meinertzhagen on April 12, 1920, in which he accused senior officials of direct responsibility for the riots. Meinertzhagen’s dispatch led to a fierce protest from Allenby that Meinertzhagen was guilty of insubordination, and that his charges were “nothing less than absurd.” Although Meinertzhagen was fired as a result, a copy of his dispatch reached Lloyd George at the end of April just as he arrived at the Inter-Allied Conference at San Remo.

At San Remo, Lloyd George and Balfour decided that Britain had to get rid of OETA and install a British civil administration, even though no peace treaty with Turkey had yet been signed. The conference formally agreed that Britain would receive the mandate for Palestine. Lloyd George and Balfour decided to appoint Herbert Samuel to head the new government of Palestine. Samuel was urged to expedite his departure for Palestine. On June 30, 1920, he reached Jerusalem and immediately took over the reins of government from General Bols.

The British Mandate: 1920–1929

On June 28, 1919, the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations were signed. The concept of the mandatory system was provided in the Article 22 of the Covenant of the Treaty. This article stated:

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which for­ merly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the mod­ ern world, there should be applied the principle that the well­being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust be embodied in this Covenant. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations . . . and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League.

The League of Nations recognized the Arab communities lying between the Mediterranean and the Persian frontier, formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire, as “sepa­rate nations . . . subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they were able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.” 193 In neglecting to consult the Arabs in the preparation of the mandate and the selection of the mandatory, the League failed to recognize the principles stipu­lated in Article 22 of the Covenant.

On July 24, 1922, Britain submitted to the Council of the League a draft mandate for Palestine. An agreed text was approved by the Council on September 29, 1923. The mandate included in the preamble a section of the Balfour Declaration providing for the establishment of a Jewish national home with safeguards for the “non-Jewish communities” and Jews outside Palestine; in Article 2, responsibility “for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home”; in Article 4, provision was made for a “Jewish Agency” to be recognized as a “public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home”; and in Article 11, the Administration was authorized to arrange with the Jewish Agency “to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country.” 194 The mandate was drawn up jointly by the British government and the Zionists without regard to the rights of the Arabs. The Zionists believed that they, and they alone, had rights in Palestine and that the presence of Muslims and Christians inhabitants had no value. Numerous articles of the mandatory agreement referred to the Jewish com- munity by name, while the Arabs—comprising 90 percent of the population—were referred to as “the other sections” of the population. This was the beginning of the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people. 195

Herbert Samuel (1870–1963)

Herbert Samuel was raised as an Orthodox Jew, but abandoned Judaism as an undergraduate at Balliol College, Oxford. Although he rejected the Judaic faith, he never severed his links with the Jewish community. He retained his synagogue membership and gave his children a religious upbringing. He deplored Jewish intermarriage with gentiles; when his daughter’s children married out of the faith, he refused to see them or speak to them until shortly before his death.

In 1909, Samuel became the first Jew to hold cabinet office in England. In November 1914, after Britain declared war against Turkey, he proposed to Lloyd George the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine under British protection. In early 1915, he circulated two memoranda on Palestine to the cabinet, urging British sponsorship of Zionism. Having impressed Lloyd George and Milner, members of the war cabinet, with his arguments, Samuel was consulted by the cabinet during the final stages of the discussion leading to the Balfour Declaration. Weizmann met Samuel for the first time in December 1914. According to Weizmann, Samuel said: “I believe that a realization of the Zionist dream is possible.” He even criticized Weizmann’s views as beig too modest, and insisted that big things would have to be done in Palestine.

For the following five years Samuel became one of the Zionists’ most important allies; during 1918 and 1919 he was one of Weizmann’s closet collaborators. In the crucial Anglo-Zionist negotiations of 1918–1919 regarding the implementation of the Balfour Declaration, Samuel acted as a Zionist spokesman. He was the chairman of the committee that drafted the Zionist Organization’s political proposals for submission to the British government and to the peace conference.

At a rally held in London on the second anniversary of the Balfour Declaration in November 1919, he defined the ultimate aim of Zionism:

The immediate establishment of a complete and purely Jewish State in Palestine would mean placing a majority under the rule of minority; it would therefore be contrary to the first principles of de­mocracy, and would undoubtedly be disapproved by the public opinion of the world [The real policy of the responsible leaders of Zionism is rather to secure the creation of conditions such that] with the minimum of delay the country may become a purely self­ governing Commonwealth under the auspices of an established Jewish majority. 196

In early 1920, Samuel visited Palestine at the request of the Foreign Office to report on financial and administrative conditions there. The political reality of Palestine was profound; the overriding impression he received was of the strength and seriousness of Arab nationalist hostility to Zionism. In Nablus he met a deputation of Arabs who told him: “If the Zionists are going to immigrate into Palestine a terrible revolution will break out; we will do our utmost to oppose Zionism.” 197 Shortly afterward, Samuel met the leaders of the Zionist Commission and forcefully expressed his criticism of the commission’s policy toward the Arabs: “The Zionists have not recognized the force and value of the Arab nationalist movement. It is very real and no bluff.” By the end of his visit, Samuel’s view of the Zionist political outlook was pessimistic, although not without hope. He wrote to Weizmann:

I am afraid that matters have not progressed as favorably as respects Arab­Zionist relations, since you were last in Palestine The chief and most definite conclusion I have found in Palestine is that the Arab situation has been underestimated The present [Zionist] commission has the irritating effect of an alien body in living flesh. I fear it is too late now to get the confidence of the Arabs. But the attempt should not be abandoned. 198

However, he remained convinced that there was a prospect of eventually reconciling the Arabs of Palestine to the implementation of the Zionist program. He rejected the view of the military government that the force of Arab opposition to Zionism was such that the British should withhold or curtail their continued support for the Zionists. 199

Samuel realized that pacifying the Arabs through false assurances about the Zionists’ intentions would not solve the problem. The Arab fears were real, and the Zionists’ actions had clearly been acknowledged by the Arabs. The final goal of Zionism was the transfer of the Arab population of Palestine to other lands. Samuel’s own prescription for a political solution was expressed in his report to Curzon at the end of his visit: “Zionist moderation and Zionist explanations are not enough.” He believed that the more effective antidote to Arab anti-Zionism lay in finding a method that might satisfy the legitimate parts of Arab demands, while avoiding the hazards which their full acceptance would entail. He begged successive British governments to heed his idea: “The solution lies in the formation of a loose Confederation of the Arab­speaking States, each of which should be under its own appropriate govern­ ment. But all of which should be combined together for common and economic purposes.” 200 This scheme would make possible the fulfillment of Zionist political aspirations while ensuring the peaceful integration of the Jewish entity of Palestine into the surrounding region. Unfortunately, he was not heeded.

Samuel’s primary purpose in visiting the country had been to scout the land before deciding whether to accept appointment as first head of the civil administration. It appears to have been commonly understood in British and Zionist political circles that Samuel would be appointed to the position. His name had indeed been discussed as a potential governor of Palestine as early as December 1918. Samuel had the impression that there was hostility in British official circles to the appointment of a Jew as governor of Palestine. Generals Money and Watson had in 1919 expressed opposition to the appointment of any Jew, whether Zionist or non-Zionist, as head of the civil administration in Palestine. This view was shared by General Allenby, Congreve, Bols, and Waters-Taylor.

The Nebi Musa riots broke out in Jerusalem four days after Samuel returned to England from Cairo. The riots impelled Lloyd George and his colleagues, at the Allied Conference in San Remo, to install a civil administration in Palestine. Samuel, who had traveled from Egypt to San Remo, was offered the position of head of the new administration by Lloyd George. Samuel told the prime minister: “I would be ready to undertake any function in Palestine in which it was thought that I could be useful, and [I am] deeply interested in the Zionist idea and would be willing to make any sacrifice to promote its success. But . . . such an appointment [is] open to the danger that measures, which the non-Jewish population would accept from a British Christian governor, might be objected to if adopted by a Jew.” Lloyd George remained convinced that appointing Samuel was the right solution, but he agreed that Samuel should consult Weizmann and Sokolow, who were also in San Remo. The Zionist leaders urged Samuel to accept the offer. He therefore wrote to Lloyd George and accepted the appointment as the high commissioner of Palestine.

The British officials of the military administration objected strenuously to this move. Allenby wrote in a telegram to Curzon: “As regards effect on the native population I think that appointment of a Jew as first Governor will be highly dangerous They will regard appointment of a Jew, even if he is a British Jew, as handing the country over at once to a permanent Zionist Administration I anticipate that when news arrives of appointment of Mr Samuel general movement against Zionists will result, and that we must be prepared for outrages against Jews, murders, raids on Jewish villages, and raids into our territory from east if not wider movement.”

Samuel, however, regarded the appointment as the zenith of his political career. He accepted the office in Palestine as a supporter of Zionism, with the goal of fur­thering the realization of the Zionist dream. He would never have gone to Palestine if there were no Zionist question and if there had been no Balfour Declaration. The extent of his commitment is made clear in a letter written to a relative two weeks before he left for Jerusalem:

What is practicable in Palestine now is one thing. What the present measures will lead to—and are designed to lead to in the future—is another. For the time being there will be no Jewish state, there will be restricted immigration; there will be cautious colonization. In five years the pace will probably be accelerated and will grow after that progressively in speed. In fifty years there may be a Jewish major­ ity in the population. Then the government will be predominantly Jewish, and in the generation after that there may be that which might properly be a Jewish country with a Jewish state. It is that prospect which rightly evokes such a fine enthusiasm, and it is the hope of realizing that future which makes me ready to sacrifice much in the present. 201

Samuel’s Administration of Palestine

Following the establishment of the British civil administration of Palestine on July 1, 1920, Herbert Samuel, who had helped frame the Balfour Declaration, was appointed as the high commissioner. The other British officials appointed included Norman Bentwitch as attorney general, Albert Hyamson as director of immigration, and Max Nurock as principal assistant secretary to the government. Samuel selected Brigadier­General Wyndham Deeds, who had previously served in Palestine as chief intelligence officer under Clayton, as his first secretary. Deeds, a close friend of Weizmann, was known to be sympathetic to Zionism.

The British mandatory government in Palestine then undertook the imple­ mentation of the Balfour Declaration. Britain’s main interest in establishing a na­ tional home for the Jews in Palestine was of a strategic nature. Palestine was the key buffer state in the British imperial defense of India, Egypt, and the Suez Canal; it was also the principal terminus of the oil pipelines from the Iraqi oil fields of the British­-owned Iraq Petroleum Company. A Zionist state in the Middle East would be a guaranty for such interests. To fulfill the promise and to achieve their goal of planting a foreign body in the center of the Arab world, it was essential to follow a detailed plan to facilitate Jewish immigration to Palestine, and to assist the Zionists in acquiring land. 202

While the Jews received Samuel with great enthusiasm, the Arabs were cautious and reserved. Still, in his first encounters with leading Arabs, Samuel left a favorable impression. At an assembly of notables at the Government House in Jerusalem, he read a message from the king of England and delivered an impressive speech. After the ceremony, a number of the guests gathered at the house of Aref Pasha Dajani, who was reported to have declared: “Our work is lost. I am afraid that Herbert Samuel will win the hearts of all the inhabitants within a month. As it seems, he is of a very honorable family. His influence on the audience is considerable.” 203

Immediately upon his arrival, Samuel implemented several measures designed to facilitate the establishment of the Jewish national home. A land ordinance issued in September 1920 permitted Zionists to acquire land. Shortly afterward, one of the most important Zionist land purchases of the mandatory period was completed. The Sursuq family sold over forty thousand acres in Marj Ibn Amer, comprising eighteen villages, to the Palestine Land Development Company (PLDC). Over the following decade, the heart of the Jewish agricultural settlements, the kibbutzim, were built on this land. Next, as of September 1, 1920, Palestine became freely and legally open to Jewish immigration; 16,500 immigrants were permitted to enter Palestine annually. Samuel’s administration allowed the elected Jewish assembly, which had been banned by General Bols in May, to convene in October 1920. Jabotinsky and other Jews who had been imprisoned as a result of the April riots were released. 204

At the same time, Samuel’s administration released all Arabs convicted during the April riots. On August 1, 1920, Samuel traveled to es-Salt in Transjordan. He was welcomed by a large number of sheikhs, who asked that pardons be granted to Aref al-Aref and Hajj Amin al-Husayni (see below). Samuel pardoned them, and the two men returned to Jerusalem. Aref was shortly afterward offered a post in the government, which he accepted. The new civil administration established an advisory council consisting of eleven officials and ten non-officials (four Muslims, three Christians, and three Jews) all nominated by the high commissioner. The first meeting of the council took place on October 6, 1920. Samuel, the president of the council, declared in his opening speech, “It should be clearly understood that this is to be regarded only as a first step in the development of self­governing institutions.” 205

Following the removal of Faysal from Damascus at the end of July 1920 (see page XX), Musa Kazim al­Husayni declared on August 5, 1920: “Now after the latest events in Syria, we have to make a complete change in our plans. Southern Syria no longer exists; it is Palestine we have to defend.” In December 1920 , the Third Palestine Arab Congress convened at Haifa; the congress affirmed Muslim­Christian unity, condemned Zionism, and elected an executive committee headed by Musa Kazim al­Husayni, which was empowered to act as the permanent representative body of the Palestinian Arabs. (The second Palestine congress was supposed to convene in first half of 1920; however, the mandate authority had barred it from happening). Although the mandate administration did not recognize the congress as a legitimate representative of the Palestinians, Samuel met with the executive committee in formal meetings discussing all affairs related to the Arabs. At the first meeting, on January 16, 1921, Samuel

. . . explained to the Committee that the Balfour Declaration consisted of two parts of equal importance. First, that which made provision for the establishment of a Jewish national home, and secondly, that which made provision for the safeguarding of the rights and interests of the existing population. He stated that he regarded it as his duty carry out the second part of the second part of the Declaration no less than the first. 206

At the second meeting with the executive committee on February 4, 1921, Samuel read out extracts from the draft of the mandate, and insisted on the committee’s acceptance of the mandate as a condition of recognition by the government. The executive committee refused to accept Samuel’s request.

In March 1921, the secretary of state for the colonies, Winston Churchill, visited Palestine. In Jerusalem on March 28, an Arab deputation headed by Musa Kazim al-Husayni met Churchill and presented a lengthy protest against Zionism, the Balfour Declaration, and the appointment of Herbert Samuel. In reply, Churchill rejected criticism of Samuel, insisted that the Balfour declaration was “manifestly right,” asserted that Britain had a right to decide the destiny of Palestine by the virtue of the blood of two thousand British soldiers who had died there, promised the Arabs that they would not be dispossessed, and urged them to cooperate with the Jews to their mutual benefit.

On the same day, Churchill and Samuel had a private conversation with Emir Abdullah, who showed his appreciation for British support in Transjordan and suggested that he should be appointed emir over Palestine as well. When Churchill rejected this request, Abdullah asked whether Britain intended to set up a Jewish kingdom in Palestine and turn out the existing Arab population. He complained that the British “appeared to think men could be cut down and transplanted in the same way as trees.” Samuel replied that there was no intention either to cut down or to transplant, but merely to plant new trees. Churchill explained that mass Jewish immigration “was not only not contemplated, but would be a very slow process and the rights of the existing population would be strictly preserved.” 207

During Churchill’s visit, the old mufti of Jerusalem, Kamil al­Husayni, died. While still on his deathbed, the mufti had recommended the appointment of his nephew Hajj Amin al-Husayni (1897–1974) to replace him as the new mufti. The conflict between the Husayni and Nashashibi families complicated the issue of the appointment of a new mufti and divided the Muslim community. Many of the opponents of the executive committee supported the appointment of Hajj Amin. Several petitions supporting the candidacy of Hajj Amin reached the office of the high commissioner, not only from the Muslim community, but from the Greek Orthodox community as well.

Hajj Amin al-Husayni (1895–1974)

The mufti of Jerusalem in the Ottoman era was considered a minor official, subordinate to the sheikh al-Islam in Istanbul; his jurisdiction was restricted to Jerusalem. The British had rewarded Kamil al-Husayni in exchange for his cooperation, giving him the title of grand mufti and extending his jurisdiction to all of Palestine. They had also expanded his authority over the Shari’a court of appeals.

Ottoman regulations required an electoral college to nominate three candidates for mufti, from whom the sheikh al-Islam in Istanbul would choose one. The British attempted to maintain the tradition through a similar process by forming a committee composed of prominent Muslim leaders to hold an election. Four candidates were on the ballot: Hajj Amin al­Husayni, Husam al­Din Jaralla, Khalil al­Khalidi, and Musa al­Budayri. The Muslim committee put together by the government met on April 12, 1921 and elected Jaralla, Khalidi, and Budayri. The public was strongly opposed to the selection process, however, and supported Hajj Amin’s candidacy. Samuel had expected that Amin would be one of the three chosen by the committee, and was prepared to appoint him for the post. Samuel met Amin twice in April prior to the election to size him up. According to Bentwich, the attorney general:

[Amin declared] his earnest desire to cooperate with the Government, and his belief in the good intentions of the Government towards the Arabs. He gave assurances that the influence of his family and him­ self would be devoted to maintaining tranquility in Jerusalem and he felt sure that no disturbance need to be feared this year. He said the riots of last year had been spontaneous and unpremeditated. If the government took reasonable precaution, he felt sure they would not be repeated. 208

The mandate authority searched for a legal way to appoint Amin. Samuel asked Ronald Storrs, the district governor of Jerusalem, to persuade Raghib al-Nashshibi to ask Jaralla to drop out, which he did. This maneuver enabled Amin to be one of the three candidates. Samuel then appointed him as mufti in May 1921.

Amin al­Husayni played a significant role in the Palestinian National Movement. He was considered by most to be the symbol of the Palestinian Resistance and the leader of the struggle against the British-Zionist colonial project. He was born in Jerusalem in 1895. The Husaynis consider themselves ashraf (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad). Amin’s great-grandfather, Muhammad al­Badri, had traced his origins to Husayn, son of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the prophet’s cousin, and Fatima, the prophet’s daughter. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the post of mufti of Jerusalem had been held by Abd al-Qader ibn Karim al-Din al-Husayni, who died leaving no male heir. The post went to other families—the Alamis and the Jarallas. Abd al-Qader’s female descendants were able to retain the al-Husayni name. At the end of the eighteenth century, the Husaynis recaptured the office of the mufti, which they held, with few interruptions, well into the twentieth century. Amin’s father Tahir succeeded his father Mustafa as mufti of Jerusalem, and when he died in 1908, Mustafa’s eldest son, Kamil, replaced him.

Amin attended a local Muslim elementary school (kuttab) that emphasized Islamic history, theology, Arabic, and literature. Later he attended a government Turkish school. At age sixteen he was ready for higher education. In 1912 he attended al­Azhar University in Cairo, then Dar al­Da’wa and al­Irshad, where Rashid Rida, the Muslim Arab reformer, mentored him. Rida was a follower of the Islamic reformers Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abdu. Thus, Amin was introduced to Islamic reform and Arab revival. While in Cairo, Amin helped organize a Palestinian society to oppose Zionism.

In the summer of 1913, he accompanied his mother on the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), whereby he earned the title of al-Hajj; and then went back to Jerusalem. A few months later he joined the military academy in Istanbul. When World War I broke out, he joined the army. Amin’s ideology was seemingly a mixture of contradictory views: Ottomanism, Islam, Pan-Arab nationalism, and Palestinian nationalism. His loyalty to the Ottoman state faded after the policy of Turkification, and when he returned from Turkey in February 1917, he helped organize some two thousand Palestinians to fight against the Turks in Transjordan with Emir Faysal’s army.

At the end of the war, Hajj Amin devoted his life to the Palestinian cause. In 1918, he was elected president of the Arab Club (al­Nadi al­Arabi). This club was composed of younger generation of educated Husaynis; they were Pan-Arabists whose objective was the unification of Palestine with Syria. Two other organizations—the Muslim­ Christian Association (al­Jam’iyya al­Islamiyya al­Masihiyya) and the Literary Club (al­Muntada al­Adabi)—were formed in Jerusalem by other activists: The Muslim-Christian Association represented the older generation of urban elites who sought to preserve their position of leadership through autonomy under the British rule; and the Literary Club consisted of young members of the Nashashibi family, which was anti-British at that time, probably because of the family’s connection with the French agents. The three organizations were united on one idea: the Palestinians were the rightful inhabitants of Palestine and had owned the land for at least 1,300 years, and the Zionists had no legitimate claim.

In January 1922, Herbert Samuel established a Supreme Muslim Council responsible for Muslim affairs and facilitated the appointment of Hajj Amin as its permanent president. The mufti’s power expanded as he was given considerable authority and control over the Shari’a courts, the hiring and dismissal of court officials, the religious schools and orphanages, and waqf (charitable endowment) boards and funds. Such authority enhanced the mufti’s prestige and increased his power throughout Palestine.

The mufti’s religious initiatives during the 1920s stimulated an Islamic revival throughout Palestine. He established a Muslim orphanage of 160 girls and boys, supported schools such as Rawdat al-Ma’arif, repaired the Nahawiyya School building within the Haram al-Sharif and established a library and museum there, imported fifty thousand trees to plant on waqf land, expanded welfare and health clinics, and renovated the two mosques in the rectangular area of the Haram, along with numerous local mosques. 209

The mufti concentrated his efforts on his religious duties and avoided political activities, which were handled by the leadership of the executive committee. By 1928 he had managed to consolidate his religious power. At the same time he enhanced his political position by verbally attacking Zionism and the British policies, but he was careful to keep his promise to the mandatory government to uphold law and order, and made sure that the Nebi Musa celebration remained peaceful. He refrained from organizing or participating in demonstrations.

Political Strife and the 1922 White Paper

The riots which broke out in Jaffa on May Day (International Labor Day), were a shock to the mandate administration. The violence began when a small group of Jewish communists held a procession in Tel Aviv. The communists collided with a larger procession organized by the Jewish socialist party. The police intervened and drove the communists to an area of sand dunes separating Jaffa from Tel Aviv. Arabs from the neighboring Menshieh gathered at the site. The police drew up in a cordon between the Arabs and the Jews. The Arabs turned and started an attack on Jewish shops in the Menshieh, then attacked a hostel where Jewish immigrants were staying; the occupants were beaten to death. This was followed by street fighting. By the end of the day twenty-seven Jews were killed and 104 wounded. Among the Arabs, three were killed and thirty-four wounded. On the following day attacks began on Petah Tekva, Kfar Saba, and Rehovot.

Samuel, who recognized the riots as being a setback to his policy, looked for the root of the problem and concluded, based on the deadly attack at the immigrants’ hostel, that Jewish immigration was the real cause of the violence. When Samuel was presented with a demand by Musa Pasha al­Husayni that “Jewish immigration should be stopped so that bloodshed and devastation in the country should come to an end,” he took three steps. First, he asked General Allenby, the high commissioner in Egypt, to temporarily accommodate the immigrants who were en route in the Mediterranean at Port Said or Alexandria. Secondly, he asked the Zionist Commission to temporarily suspend immigration. Thirdly, he authorized the British governor of Ramleh to inform the crowd of Arab pilgrims at the Nebi Saleh festival that immigration had been suspended.

Allenby refused to accommodate the immigrants, and suggested that the three boats be returned to Constantinople. On May 14, 1921, the British authority made a public announcement in Jaffa concerning the suspension of immigration; however, the following day, a ship arrived at the port carrying both Christians and Jews. Only the Christians were allowed to leave the boat.

At the end of May, the Fourth Palestinian Congress convened in Jerusalem, where it was agreed that nonviolent political means should be used to try to persuade the British government to concede to the nationalists’ demands, and they decided to send a delegation to London to negotiate with the British government.

General Congreve, the commander of British forces in the Middle East, traveled to London to propagate his view that if “all the methods to implement Balfour Declaration” were employed, sooner or later the whole country would be in a state of insurrection and the only way of enforcing the policy would be by military force. In later talks to the Colonial Office officials, Congreve declared that “he and all his officers were under the impression that HMG were in the hands of the Zionist Organization.” He also stated, “Whilst the Army officially is supposed to have no politics . . . in the case of Palestine [the sympathies of Army officers] are rather obviously with the Arabs, who have hitherto appeared to the disinterested observer to have been the victims of the unjust policy forced upon them by the British Government.” In response to this declaration, Churchill invited the Air Ministry to assume the responsibility for defending Palestine. 210

On June 3, 1921, Samuel, at a ceremony at the Government House, explained what Balfour Declaration meant:

That the Jews, a people who are scattered throughout the world but whose hearts are always turned to Palestine, would be enabled to found here their home, and that some among them, within the limits that are fixed by the numbers and interests of the present population, should come to Palestine in order to help by their resources and ef­ forts to develop the country, to the advantage of all its inhabitants. If any measures are needed to convince the Muslim and Christian population that those principles will be observed in practice and that their rights are really safe, such measures will be taken. For the British Government the trustee under the Mandate for the happiness of the people of Palestine, would never impose upon them a policy which the people had reason to think was contrary to their religious, their political, and their economic interests. 211

Another White Paper

On June 13, 1921, Samuel wrote to Churchill: “. . . I cannot exclude from my mind the possibility of further disturbances or even, as my military advisers have warned me, of a general uprising.” He then proposed the transformation of the Advisory Council into an elected rather than a nominated one, in the belief that repression alone would increase Arab bitterness. Churchill’s initial reaction to Samuel’s proposal was unfavorable; however, when the Arab delegation set off for London, Samuel wrote to Churchill again: “[The delegation] will ask for the entire abandonment of the Balfour Declaration, but they do not expect to secure this, and you will probably find that they will then be willing to come to an arrangement more or less on the lines indicated in my speech on June 3rd.”

Churchill presented his concerns to the cabinet: “The Zionist policy is profoundly unpopular with all except the Zionists. Both Arabs and Jews are armed and arming, ready to spring at each other’s throats . . . Dr. Weizmann and the Zionists are extremely discontented at the progress made . . . I have done and doing my best to give effect to the pledge given to the Zionists by Mr Balfour . . . I am prepared to continue in this course, if it is the settled resolve of the Cabinet.” 212 The cabinet failed to reach any settled resolve. The Palestinian delegation rejected any compromise, and demanded a national government, the abolition of the Jewish national home, an immediate halt to immigration, and unity with other Arab states. Various proposals presented by the British government to the delegation were rejected, as they did not include a clear representative assembly.

By November 1921, the talks in London were at an impasse. Churchill then suggested convening a meeting between the Palestinian delegation and Weizmann in the presence of Colonial Office officials. This meeting took place on November 29, 1921, but the outcome was negative. In February 1922, the Colonial Office published a draft of a proposed constitution for Palestine. The final version of the constitution provided for an elected council that would contain twenty­two members, includ­ing at least two Christians and two Jewish members. An important article provided the high commissioner with power to confer with a committee consisting of half of the elected members of each community on the council on all issues relating to the regulation of immigration. It also included an article that no or­ dinance might be passed by the assembly which was in any way repugnant to or inconsistent with the mandate. Promulgation of the final version of the Palestinian constitution was delayed, however, because the Council of the League of Nations had not yet passed the mandate of Palestine.

In May 1922, Samuel visited England, and after meeting with the Zionists, the Arabs, and the Colonial Office officials, he drew up a statement policy. After being accepted by Churchill and the cabinet, the statement was published as a white paper and approved on July 6, 1922, by the British House of Commons. This 1922 White Paper formed the basis of British policy in Palestine for a nearly a decade. It emphasized the continued British commitment to support Zionism while at the same time seeking to reassure the Arabs of Palestine with respect to the implication of that support. It emphasized:

[The British government has] never at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab Delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arab population, language, or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the [Balfour] Declaration . . . do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine. The thought that His Majesty’s Government had committed itself to make Palestine as Jewish as England is English was unfounded. It is also necessary to point out that the Zionist Commission in Palestine, does not pos­sess, and has not desired to possess, any share in the general admin­istration of the country. . . .

When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish com­ munity, with the assistance of Jews in other parts the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish peoples as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a free opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon historic connection . . . This then, is the interpretation which His Majesty’s Government place upon the Declaration of 1917; and, so understood, the Secretary of State is of the opinion that it does not contain or imply anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of Palestine or disappointment to the Jews. 213

The publication of the 1922 White Paper was followed in quick succession by the passing of the mandate for Palestine by the League of Nations Council in their meeting in London on July 24, 1922, and then by the promulgation of the Palestine Constitution as an Order-in-Council on August 10, 1922. These measures were formally accepted by the Zionists with some informal reservations, but were rejected in total by the Fifth Palestine Arab Congress which met in Nablus in August 1922. Despite the Arab rejection, the government went ahead with an attempt to try to put the constitution into effect.

In preparation for the election, the mandate government began to prepare for a census in order to carry out the registration of electors. Although the government succeeded in completing the census, the attempt to hold elections for the legislative council was a failure, and proved to be a humiliating setback to Samuel’s policy. A great campaign was organized by the Palestine Arab Executive Committee urging a boycott of the election. All over Palestine, clergy condemned the election. The Arabic press denounced it in print, and mass meetings took place in all Palestinian towns in support of the boycott.

Deeds toured the countryside in an attempt to persuade the mukhtars (elected village officials) to participate in the election. All his efforts failed to gain any support in the countryside. Samuel held a number of meetings with a group of notables who were willing to participate in the election in return for certain concessions. They demanded an agreed annual numerical limit on Jewish immigration, an increase in the number of Arab officials, the appointment of an Arab emir over Palestine, and an increase in the number of Arab members of the legislative council (the additional numbers being nominated by the high commissioner). But the talks broke down because Samuel failed to get the support of the Colonial Office for these proposed concessions. The Zionists tried to encourage Arabs to participate through bribery. Through Ragheb Bey Nashashibi, they succeeded in getting three nominations in Jerusalem: Ragheb’s brother, Aref Dajani, and Zaki Nusseibeh.

The result of the elections showed the overwhelming success of the boycott campaign. Only 213 secondary electors out of projected 809 were elected. Of these, seventy-nine were Jews. All nominated by the Arabs were unopposed and were drawn from opponents of the Arab Executive, and in the entire country, a total of only 1,397 votes were cast. Of these 1,172 were Jewish. After the election, several of the elected Arabs withdrew. It was clear that the first stage of the elections had failed. The success of the boycott was welcomed by the Palestine Executive as a great triumph. On the other hand, Ragheb Bey Nashashibi expressed his disappointment, and in a meeting with the director of the Political Department of the Palestine Zionist Executive, he blamed the government for not taking firm action to ensure the success of the election.

The failure of the election alarmed Samuel and the Colonial Office. Samuel proposed the revival of the advisory council he had established in October 1920, which was composed of eleven officials and ten non-officials (four Muslims, three Christians, and three Jews), all appointed by the High Commission. Following the riots of May 1921, he tried to revive the advisory council as an elected rather than an appointed body, in an attempt to satisfy public opinion by presenting it as a further step on the road of self-government.

Samuel was encouraged by a letter he had received from Jamal al­Husayni on March 22, 1923, stating that the Palestine Arab Executive was willing to cooper­ ate with the government in all administrative questions that were unconnected to the application of the rejected constitution. Samuel then contacted Musa Kazim Pasha al­Husayni and discussed the proposal, stating that the proposed council was not meant to solve the political impasse, but rather to deal with administrative matters like the original one of October 1920. He also invited him to serve on the advisory council. Musa Kazim Pasha declined the invitation, but did not express strong opposition. As a result of such communications with the prominent members of the Arab Executive, Samuel proceeded with his plan to revive the advisory council, and on May 8, 1923, he nominated ten Arabs. All nominees accepted the invitation to serve, and on May 29, the establishment of the council was published. A storm of protest against the council and condemnation of the nominees who agreed to serve broke out immediately. On June 4, 1923 the Palestine Arab Executive adopted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of the Arab members of the council. The Sixth Palestine Congress, which met in Jaffa in mid-June 1923, endorsed the Arab Executive’s decisions. The nominees began to feel uneasy, and communicated their unease to the government and to the Zionists. According to the diary of Colonel Frederick Kish, Aref Pasha Dajani and Ragheb Bey said that they would agree to sit on the council in return for 500 British pounds each. But pressure on the nominees mounted, and in the course of the summer seven out of the ten Arab nominees withdrew. Samuel’s plan apparently had collapsed. 214

New Measures by Samuel

In June 1923 Samuel visited London to confer with the Colonial Office and the new Conservative government. At the same time, another Arab delegation headed by Musa Kazim al-Husayni arrived in London, lobbying for a change in British policy. Immediately after assuming office in November 1922, the new Conservative government decided that there would be no change of policy in Palestine. Samuel met with a Cabinet subcommittee chaired by the secretary of state for the colonies, the Duke of Devonshire. Curzon, the foreign secretary, was the most prominent member of the subcommittee. Curzon proposed the creation of an Arab Agency analogous to the Jewish Agency (Jewish Executive) that the mandate had given the Zionists, with similar rights of consultation with the government. This proposal was endorsed by the subcommittee and by the Cabinet as a whole. Unlike the Jewish Agency, the Arab Agency was to consist of members nominated by the high commissioner. It was to have the right to confer with the government of Palestine on all matters affecting the interests of the non-Jewish population; specially included in this category was Jewish immigration. 215

On October 11, 1923, Samuel invited twenty-six notables to the Government

House and formally presented them with the Arab Agency proposal. Musa Kazim Pasha al-Husayni, after a brief interval for consideration during which the opponents of the Arab Executive were the most insistent on rejection, spoke for all those present when he declared that they were unable to accept the proposal, as it fell short of the demands of the Arab population. The failure of this proposal was the last of Samuel’s attempts to provide constitutional legitimacy for British rule in Palestine.216

The colonial secretary, Devonshire, cabled to Samuel:

H.M.G.’s object is to make clear that they have for their part said their last word and that in face of repeated Arab rejection they do not propose to renew their offer. Further overtures, if any, towards coopera­tion must come not from us but from Arabs. Deplorable impressions of weakness would in my opinion be produced by renewal of our past offers in any form at present juncture. 217

The Supreme Muslim Council

All the plans proposed by Samuel were intended to induce Palestinian leaders to accept the Balfour Declaration, in order to legitimize the Jewish national home and the British mandate. The failure of his plans led him to resort to different measures aimed at gaining their cooperation with the mandate authority in bringing calm and to control violent reaction of the masses against the British and the Zionists. His policies combined deception and bribery. The creation of the Supreme Muslim Council as a semi-autonomous institution was one of the most successful measures. The power given to the mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, was the best expression of Samuel’s plan. He presented this institution as being analogous to the Zionist Commission.

The Supreme Muslim Council had been established by the mandate government in the wake of the riots of May 1921 to conciliate the Muslim Arabs and to provide them with a form of autonomy in religious matters. The government transferred all Muslim assets (awqaf ), as well as the Shari’a courts, to the Muslim leaders of the council. The Council was elected in January 1922 by the secondary Muslim electors to the Ottoman parliament of 1914 who were still alive and resident in Palestine. Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the mufti of Jerusalem, was chosen as president of the council. The election of Hajj Amin as president of the council made him the most powerful political figure in Arab Palestine. The council enjoyed huge powers, including the right to appoint all qadis (judges), muftis, and Shari’a and awqaf officials. Although it paid the salaries of these officials, the government of Palestine did not interfere in its appointments or dismissals. Such arrangements conferred on Hajj Amin a maximum of power. Samuel’s intention, in granting the Council and the mufti such power, was the creation of an “intermediary between the Muslims and the mandate adminis­ tration.” He considered this achievement as being one of his great successes. He praised “the Mufti and his personal friends [who] are always active in times politi­ cal crisis . . . in preventing people getting too excited and too violent.” 218

The creation of the Supreme Muslim Council and the autonomy that was granted to the council and its president was not Samuel’s sole action aimed at encouraging the Arabs of Palestine to cooperate with the Palestinian government. He also appointed as many Arabs of notable families as possible to positions in government service. In addition, he urged the Colonial Office to restore the elected municipalities in Palestine.

Zionist Institutions Created under Herbert Samuel

The Zionist Commission had been established in 1918 during the British military administration in Palestine. It was renamed in 1921 as the Palestine Jewish Executive. Article 4 of the mandate recognized the Jewish Executive as a “public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home.” Article 4 was incorporated in the mandate and finally approved by the League of Nations in July 1922; it provided a legal basis for the activities of the Palestine Zionist Executive as a quasi-government of the Jewish community in Palestine. This Zionist body enjoyed the first loyalty of at least 90 percent of the Jewish population of Palestine. It ran its own school system, its own bank, and its own health service; organized Jewish immigration; and directed Jewish settlements. Its chairman had regular access to the high commissioner and other government officials. In 1922, Samuel proposed that the Colonial Office recognize the Jewish community as having a juridical character, and grant the Zionist Executive wide powers of autonomy, including the right to levy taxation. In 1925, the pro-Zionist secretary of state for the colonies, Leo S. Amery, and his under-secretary, William Ormsby-Gore, approved Samuel’s proposal over the objections of officials in the Colonial Office.

Two other autonomous Zionist institutions were created during Samuel’s term to prepare for the future Jewish state in Palestine: the Histadrut and the Hagana. The Histadrut (General Federation of Hebrew Workers in the land of Israel) was established in December 1920. The second institution, the Hagana—the underground army of the Zionists—exercised its power for the first time during the riots of May 1921. When Churchill learned about it in July 1921, he told Weizmann: “We won’t mind it , but don’t speak of it.” In December 1921 a wooden crate burst open accidentally on the docks at Haifa, leading to the seizure of three hundred pistols and seventeen thousand rounds of ammunition which the Hagana had been trying to smuggle into Palestine from Vienna. 219