PALESTINE

A History of the Land and Its People

Chapter 12: The Ottoman Empire

The Origins of the Ottoman Empire (1285–1923)

The original home of the Turks was in Central Asia. Between the seventh and eleventh centuries, most Turks lived in the area north of the Syr Darya River and the Aral Sea. A few Turkic groups moved west to Eastern Europe, including the Bulgars, KhazarsCumans (the western Qipchaqs), and Pechengs. As early as the beginning of the ninth century, the Qarluq and the Oghuz began their crossing of the Syr Darya into Transoxiana. The Qarluq, who converted to Islam around 960, seized Bukhara and Samarqand. The Oghuz, who also converted to Islam, left the region north of the Aral Sea and entered Transoxiana in the 980s.

The empire of Khazaria (see page XX) controlled several ethnic groups in the north: the Magyars, the Bulgars, the Pechenegs, the Oghuz (Ghuzz), and the Burtas. These different groups were vassals who supported the Khazars in their wars and paid tribute to the kagans, the Khazar rulers. In the second half of the tenth century, the Khazars were defeated by the Rus and lost control over the steppes; however, the Rus were unable to control this vast region as the Khazars had. The Seljuks—the founders of Muslim Turkey—were a Turkic tribe related to the Oghuz who moved southward into the vicinity of Bokhara. They were related to the Khazars; in fact, Seljuk himself was brought up at the Khazar kagan’s court.

In 1033, a drought in Transoxiana forced the Seljuks, led by Tughril, to cross the Amu Darya into Khorasan in search of grazing land. In 1040 they controlled Khorasan, and soon after, began a campaign of conquest westward across Iran. Over the following few years they captured Hamadan and Esfahan, then advanced into Armenia, eastern Anatolia, and northern Iraq. In 1055 the Sunni caliph, in Baghdad, invited Tughril to take over his capital from the Shi’te Buyid’s control. In 1071, the Seljuks destroyed a huge Byzantine army in the historic battle of Manzikert and captured their emperor. This marked the creation of the most powerful empire in the world during the next several hundred years. 1 During the reign of Tughril’s successors, the empire expanded to include Armenia and Georgia, most of Syria and Palestine, and parts of Yemen and the Persian Gulf.

The Seljuk Empire disappeared in the early part of the fourteenth century, after two Mongol invasions, the first in 1243, when Batu (a grandson of Genghis Khan and chief of the western part of the Mongol Empire) of the Golden Horde attacked the sultanate and won a decisive victory at Kose Dagh; the second in 1260, when Hulegu (the Mongol chief of all Russians, who had sacked Baghdad in 1258, ending the Abassid dynasty) asserted his authority over the eastern half of Anatolia. Following these two defeats, the Seljuk’s sultanate witnessed several decades of destructive civil wars which led to the empire’s complete elimination.

The Rise of the Turks

Hulegu’s conquest sparked a large wave of Turkish immigration into central and western Anatolia. As they entered these territories, the process of Turkification of the peninsula accelerated. Many of the Turkish newcomers joined the successful tribal invaders, which enabled some of the chieftains to gain power. One of these, the Seljuk chieftain of a Turkish tribe, Osman (born about 1260) developed a power base at Soghut. Osman benefited from the trade route between the Aegean and Central Asia, taxing the merchants who were using this route. His successful raids attracted large number of tribal invaders and adventurers. Osman’s group became known as the Ottomans, or followers of Osman. This power base evolved into a state during the early part of the fourteenth century. Osman’s son, Orhancaptured Bursa, Nicaea, and Nicomedia between 1326 and 1337. 2 During the reigns of Orhan and his son Murat I, the Ottoman sultanate captured several parts of the Balkans, and during the following two centuries evolved into a great empire. The Ottoman Empire was an extension of the Seljuk Turkish Empire, which had ruled over a large portions of Western and Central Asia between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries. The Ottoman sultans claimed descent from the Seljuk dynasties.

During the late part of the fourteenth century and the beginning of the fifteenth century, the newly born Ottoman Empire suffered a major setback when Tamurlaine’s forces, in 1402, defeated their army at Ankara and captured the sultan Bayezit I, who died in captivity eight months later (see page XX). The sultanate nearly disintegrated as a result of a long civil war between the sons of Bayezit. In 1413Mehmet I revived the sultanate after he defeated his brother, and recaptured western Anatolia, and the European territories that had been lost during the civil war.

The most glorious periods of the Ottoman Empire were the reigns of Sultan Mehmet II (1451–1481), Sultan Selim I (1512–1520), and Sultan Suleyman (1520– 1566). Sultan Mehmet II captured Constantinople in 1453, annexed Serbia in 1459, and conquered the Safavids and annexed their territories in eastern Anatolia, most of Iraq, and Iran in 1473. Sultan Selim I captured Tabriz, the Safavid capital, defeated the Mamluks, and annexed all their territories including Syria, Egypt, and Hijaz in 1517. Sultan Suleyman I captured Iraq, Hungary, the island of Rhodes, and most of the North African coast.

The Ottomans and Palestine

Palestine, Syria, and the Hijaz were high on the list of the Ottoman government priorities. The legitimacy of Ottoman authority was, in Muslim eyes, bound up with the sultan’s control of the Islamic holy cities and the routes of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. The cities of Jerusalem, Damascus, and Mecca were important religious centers: Jerusalem was the site of Muhammad’s ascent to heaven, and Damascus was the place through which Muslims from the north and the east passed to make the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. 3 In addition, Palestine and Syria were im- portant sources of tax revenue for the Ottoman Empire; the Palestinian cities of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Acre, Nablus, Gaza, Bethlehem, and Hebron had trade connections with Europe and with the markets of Egypt, Lebanon, and other neighboring countries. Damascus and Aleppo were of great commercial significance; besides their trade with Europe, they derived their commercial wealth from pilgrimages and from trade with Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Persia, and the Gulf. 4

The Ottomans had controlled Syria, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula since 1517. The vilayat of Hijaz—which included all land from the southern border of the vilayat of Syria, south of the city of Ma’an, to the north border of the vilayat of Yemen at the city of Al Lith—had been governed by the grand sharif, the lord of Mecca and Medina who reported directly to the sultan, since 1841. In Yemen, two military expeditions were carried out to establish effective Turkish rule, the first one in 1849 and the second in 1872 which coincided with the opening of the Suez Canal. The coastal province of al-Hasa was occupied in 1871. The principalities of Najd and Shammar were autonomous under the rule of the Houses of Sa’ud and of Ibn Rashid, who conducted their affairs and wars freely.

The situation was different in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and North Africa: Britain controlled the entrance of the Persian Gulf through an agreement with Masqat, and the entrance of the Red Sea by occupying Aden in 1839, and the Perim Island in 1857; in North Africa, the Turks had lost Algeria to France in 1830 and Tunisia in 1881. England occupied Egypt and Sudan in 1882. Italy occupied most of Libya in 1912.

The Height of the Ottoman Empire

For roughly two centuries, the Ottoman Empire was one of the world’s greatest powers. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, it occupied an area of 1,300,000 square kilometers. Its population was diverse, containing large numbers of Turks, Armenians, Magyars, Arabs, Greeks, Slavs, and Berbers. It also comprised many religious groups, including Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims, several Christian denominations, and Jews. Compared to Europe, the empire had a much higher percentage of its population living in huge cities (Istanbul and Cairo) and large cities (Edime, Ismir, Aleppo, and Damascus).

Under the reign of Mehmet II (1451–1481), agents went out into the villages to seize—by force if necessary—the brightest and strongest Christian boys between the ages of eight and eighteen. They escorted the boys to Istanbul, where they were tested for a variety of abilities. The most promising were sent for training in the palaces of Edirne and Istanbul; the majority were assigned to Turkish farmers. Those who were sent to the palaces began a rigorous program of education and training. They studied the Quran and the various religious sciences; became fluent in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish; and engaged in physical training such as wrestling, archery, and horsemanship. At the end of the program, the candidates were subject to a second screening. The majority (probably 90 percent) entered high-status positions in the administration or the army. The elite 10 percent who survived the second screening, the ichoghlani, became the most powerful civilian and mili­ tary officials in the empireThose who lived with the farming families learned the Turkish language and the rudiments of Islam. When they completed their education, they were enrolled in the ranks of the Janissaries, where they received training in the use of the muskets and artillery. The Janissaries owed supreme loyalty to the sultan. Their number increased over time; at the end of Suleyman’s reign it reached twelve thousand. The Janissaries formed the bulk of the cavalry, which numbered over fifty thousand. The cavalry men were known as the sipahis. The Ottomans granted to each sipahi the agricultural tax revenue derived from a specific region. The more important the sipahi was, the larger the revenue. The powerful Turkish sipahis were the local lords in the countryside, while the authority of the devshirme was in the cities. 5

In 1421, Mehmet I claimed the title of caliph, because he realized that this titlewas needed to earn the loyalty of all Muslims. However, the Ottoman sultan was aware that he could not aspire to be the spokesman for the entire Muslim world. The other Muslim rulers, the Safavid and the Mamluk, also claimed the title of caliph. Since 1260, the Mamluks had had a descendant of the Abbasid family—a puppet with no power—in Cairo, conferring upon him the title of caliph. When Selim I defeated the Mamluks in 1517, he dismissed the puppet caliph in Cairo and proclaimed himself caliph of all Muslims, and the protector of the sacred places of Mecca and Medina. 6

From the Umayyad period (661–750) on, the ulama religious authorities had recognized the legitimacy of the government in return for a pledge from the government not to intervene in the affairs of religion. The government tried to control the ulama by employing them as qadis (judges). Some of the ulama realized that the state was using Islam as a means to legitimize its own sovereignty and policies, and they regarded government service as unethical. Most ulama, however, rationalized their service to the government and accepted employment. The Ottoman administration was the first Muslim government to develop a fully bureaucratic structure for the religious institutions of its society. Although they did not succeed in making all important ulama state employees, they were successful in controlling the religious institutions. Schools, hospitals, Sufi lodges, and mosques all over the empire facilitated the state’s efforts to make local religious leaders dependent on the government. Religious functionaries, from the highest-ranking specialists in the capital city to the lowest preachers in the villages, were tied into the system. The ulama who served the government became powerful government officials. They possessed high status, honors, and privileges, and they could pass their wealth and status to their children. The Sufi brotherhoods were considered a serious threat by the Ottoman govern­ ment, which took strict measures to monitor their activity. Sufis considered spiritual authority to be superior to government authority, and they judged the worthiness of any government by the degree to which it adhered to the principles of justice and morality. 7

The Decline of the Ottoman Empire

The first ten Ottoman sultans were highly charismatic men of great ability, and they all personally led their armies and civil administrations. Before they occupied the throne, they had been trained by long service in various administrative and military positions. The reign of Suleyman I (1520–1566) was the most glorious in the history of the Ottoman Empire. The Europeans called him Suleyman the Magnificent, and no single European state would dare to attack the empire. The potential for further Ottoman expansion was a concern for all Europeans.

The death of Suleyman, however, marked the beginning of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. The sultans who ruled over the empire during the two centuries that followed his reign had limited administrative experience, as princes of the empire were confined to the palace rather than being sent to the provinces to govern. In addition, the post-Suleyman era required the ability to reorganize the empire’s military, civil services, and tax structure. None of the new rulers had what it took to overcome the challenges facing the empire during the period between the mid-sixteenth and the mid-eighteenth centuries. 8

The main challenge was the need for new military strategies. Clashes with Austria in the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century demonstrated that the European armies were rapidly shifting their resources to musket-carrying infantry, giving them an advantage over the relatively small Janissary corps armed with swords. The Ottoman military authorities recognized that their army was losing its technological advantage over the disciplined formation of European infantry musketeers and began making changes in their military structure. The devshirme system of training enslaved boys to become Janissaries could not produce enough soldiers, and so Muslim peasants were admitted into the army. The Janissary infantry units grew in size, reaching more than eighty thousand by the beginning of the eighteenth century. However, the new Janissary corps no longer had the discipline and dedication they had had when it consisted of trained slaves. The Janissaries who were assigned to provincial garrisons established roles in the local civilian population as shopkeepers, butchers, bakers, and so on. Though they were still on the military rolls, many refused to report for service when needed. Unable to count on its own troops to report for duty, the central government was forced to cede responsibility for local governance to landlords and merchants who, as local notables, carried out the functions of the state. The result of this process was decentralization and fragmentation of the empire. The government seized the timar farms formerly granted to soldiers in return for military service and turned them over to government officials or wealthy families. The revenues were forwarded to the central government, less any extra tax the holder of the tax farm could collect. The cavalry remained a large force; however, its soldiers were paid salaries by the government rather than giving them land. The new system reduced the number of loyal cavalrymen in rural areas, and administrative and police authority declined in the countryside. The tax-farm system also forced the peasants to pay more taxes, which led to hunger and eventual eviction. The nationalist leaders took advantage of this situation, converting discontent into instability and revolts. 9

The decline of central power was accompanied by a weakening of the authority of the sultan himself. The dismantling of the devshirme system was an important factor in this decline. The important posts that had formerly been filled by loyal devshirme slaves went to members of powerful Ottoman families instead. These families gained more power by allying themselves with the leaders of the Janissaries. The sultans often allied themselves with different interest groups to protect their position against such coalitions.

During the last quarter of the seventeenth century, it became clear that the Ottoman Empire no longer had the dominant power that it once enjoyed. In 1683, the Austrians defeated the Ottomans and seized Hungary. And in 1699, an alliance between the Austrians, Venice, Poland, and Russia defeated the Ottomans and forced them to sign the treaty of Karlowitz, which recognized the loss of Hungary and ceded Southern Greece, islands in the Aegean, and the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea to Venice. Russia gained a foothold on the Black Sea.

During the first part of the eighteenth century, a reforming vizier acquired a printing press and announced sweeping military reforms patterned after the European models. His reforms were short-lived, as the leaders of the Janissaries, realizing that the new programs would lead to the loss of their privileges, forced him to abandon his reforms. At the same time, the ulama forced the removal of the printing press. This occurred at a time when the European nations were developing new technologies and techniques that allowed them to surpass the Ottomans in military and economic power by the mid-eighteenth century.

During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire faced revolts and uprisings in almost all of its European territories, which led to significant shrinking of the empire and the creation of independent European states. The empire also lost most of its territories in North Africa to the imperial European powers. 10 By the beginning of the twentieth century, the empire consisted mainly of Turkey and the Muslim Arab world.

The Wahhabi Movement

The weakness of the Ottoman Empire also allowed a serious threat to emerge in the Arabic peninsula through the revivalist Islam movement of Muhammad ibn Abdul­ Wahhab, which became known as the Wahhabi Movement. Abdul-Wahhab did not call for a change in the doctrines of Islam or a new interpretation of its tenets, but denounced innovations and accretions and advocated a return to Islam’s former purity. He was concerned about the superstitious practices that had spread. In 1747, Abdul-Wahhab found an ally in a scion of the House of Sa’ud, Emir Sa’ud, who accepted his teachings and became his champion. Sa’ud died in 1759 and was succeeded by his son Abdul Aziz ibn Sa’ud, who denounced the Turkish caliph’s authority. Through several military campaigns, the younger Sa’ud assumed full control of Iraq and Hijaz, and became a serious threat to Damascus and Aleppo. 11

Mehemed-Ali Tries to Establish an Empire

In the mid-1700s, Zahir al­‘Umar al­Zaydani (1689–1775) was appointed governor of Acre by the Ottomans. Zahir used his ties with European consuls to make trade deals independent of the Ottoman government, bringing wealth to the region and garnering popular support for his rule, establishing a strong principality in the region. He annexed Haifa, Nablus, and Safed. (Interestingly, Lebanese Shi’ites—now the base of Hezbollah—played a role in his army.) Zahir ruled until the 1770s, when the Ottomans besieged Acre. He was killed in battle by Cezzar Ahmed Pasha, nick-named “the Butcher” for his cruelty, who then ruled the region. 12

In 1811, Mehemed­Ali (1769–1849), the governor of Egypt, at the sultan’s demand, dispatched an army under the command of one of his sons to recover the holy cities of Islam from Wahhabi control. The Egyptian campaign in Arabia, which lasted seven years, ended in a decisive Egyptian victory and the surrender of the Wahhabi ruler. The power of the Mamluks was broken, and the victorious mission of the Egyptian army in restoring the sultan’s authority over the holy places of Islam enhanced the reputation and the prestige of Mehemed-Ali and his son Ibrahim in the Arab world. This gave them the idea of establishing an Arab empire, and the ambition to be its rulers. He wanted to emulate the movement begun by Zahir al-‘Umar.

The triumph of Mehemed-Ali in Arabia was followed by other successes, and he transformed the Egyptian army into a formidable force, well trained and equipped, with its own navy. In 1820, he sent an expedition into Sudan and conquered it. He sent other expeditions to the Red Sea to put an end to piracy there, and brought its ports on both the Arabian and African seaboards under his control. In response to a request from the sultan, he assisted the Turkish forces in suppressing an insurrection which had broken out in Greece. In 1822, he dispatched a naval force to occupy Crete; and two years later, a much greater military and naval force led by his son Ibrahim conquered the Morea peninsula and captured Athens. The Greek revolt was repressed, and Mehemed-Ali’s forces occupied the greater part of Greece. In 1827, however, a combined British and Russian squadron destroyed the Turco-Egyptian Fleet at Navarino, ending Egypt’s military campaigns.

Following the suppression of the Greek revolt, Mehemed-Ali pressed the sultan to reward him with the overlordship of Syria. When the sultan refused to hand over the title to the province, Mehemed-Ali took it by force. After the fortress of Acre surrendered to him in May 1832, Ibrahim moved swiftly to occupy Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo. By the end of July, he was the master of all Syria. The sultan, alarmed by how speedily Ibrahim had achieved his goal, dispatched emissaries to Mehemed-Ali to open negotiations. When, five months later, the negotiations broke down and a strong Turkish army marched into Syria, Ibrahim resumed the offensive and won a crushing victory. After this, the road to Constantinople lay wide open; however, Ibrahim halted on orders from his father, who was pressured by the Europeans. At last, in the spring of 1833, the sultan formally recognized Mehemed-Ali as governor of Syria. For the next seven years, Ibrahim administered the country on behalf of his father. 13

The conquest of Syria gave Mehemed­Ali the opportunity to establish an Arab empire. He was then in full possession of an important portion of the Arab world, including Mecca and Madina, Cairo, Jerusalem, and Damascus. He also entertained the idea of making a bid for the caliphate, since he had complete control of the holy places of Islam. The Muslims were prepared to welcome this claim; the Christians, who were envious of the fair treatment that Christians in Egypt enjoyed under his rule, were prepared to lend him their support as well.

Mehemed-Ali was an Albanian from Macedonia, but his son Ibrahim spoke of himself as an Arab and preferred to be regarded as one. He stated: ”I came to Egypt as a child, and my blood has since been colored completely Arab by the Egyptian sun.” He made no secret of his intention of reviving the Arab national consciousness and restoring Arab nationhood. During the first two years of his rule of Syria, Ibrahim was active in spreading his ideas of national regeneration. He surrounded himself with a staff who shared his ideas. In the space of less than a year, he succeeded in establishing a new order based on religious and civil equality and on protection of lives and property, in a way that Syria had not seen since the days of Arab rule in Damascus.

His initial success in building the new order was short-lived. European hostility and resistance from Arab notables whose interests and privileges were threatened by Ibrahim’s reforms hampered his efforts. Ibrahim’s march into Asia Minor opened the eyes of the world to how easy it would be for Egypt to overpower Turkey, and the consequences of replacing the outdated empire with a new modern state in the Near East. The European powers wanted to keep the Ottoman Empire alive, and were set on preventing the creation of a fresh new power that might threaten their imperialist plans. A clash between Mehemed­Ali and Britain was inevitable. His control of the Red Sea interfered with the world’s trade routes, which were of great value to British commerce. Likewise, Russia could not tolerate his advance into Syria and his intention to take Constantinople. His plans to build an Arab empire in that vital region, which would force European trade and transport to depend on his assent, rather than that of an enfeebled Turkish state that was easy to manipulate, were not acceptable.

In 1840 he was forced to withdraw from Syria due to European pressure and local discontent. The local opposition arose from the measures Ibrahim had implemented in order to build a strong army. He imposed a new, more efficient tax system that eliminated the tax farms benefiting the urban elite. He also introduced conscription; to make matters worse, he decided to disarm the population as a prelude to general recruitment. Revolts broke out all over the country, first in Nablus and Hebron, then in Lebanon and regions east of the Jordan River. The introduction of these measures lost him the popularity that he had earned initially, and when the Europeans forced him out of Syria, he had no support from the people who had welcomed him as a liberator eight years earlier.

The years which followed the termination of the Egyptian occupation in 1840 were characterized by general restlessness and periodic disturbances. In less than a year after the Egyptian withdrawal, serious trouble broke out between the Christians and the Druze in Lebanon. Disorder erupted again in 1845, 1857, and 1860. The wave of hatred spread to other parts of the country. In July 1860, the Muslims in Damascus attacked the Christians. Eleven thousand lives in Lebanon and Damascus were lost, and a great deal of property was destroyed. Foreign warships were promptly dispatched to the Syrian waters, and at the end of August, a French force landed at Beirut. Following these serious events, deliberations between the Ottoman government and the European powers took place; Lebanon ended up being placed under a privileged regime with a large measure of autonomy. Its local government was to be administered by a Christian governor with the help of a representative council. The events of 1860 were decisive in awakening people’s minds to the horrors of sectarian hatred, and the younger generation began moving in the direction of national aspiration instead of sectarian ideologies. 14

The Westernization of the Ottoman Empire

Selim III (r. 1789–1807) is considered the father of the Westernization of the Ottoman Empire. He introduced Western military techniques and weapons as well as the advanced Western sciences and technology, in an attempt to prevent further decline of the empire. He also formed a special military corps called the “New Order” who were specially trained by by European instructors. The Janissaries, however, opposed all innovations that would have compromised their privileges; they deposed him on May 29, 1807, and then assassinated him when the Bulgarian Bayraktar Mustafa brought an army to Istanbul to suppress their revolt. Selim’s nephew Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839) acceded to the throne and followed his uncle’s modernizing reforms. Mahmud realized that for reforms to be successful, they had to encompass the entire scope of Ottoman institutions and society, not only a few elements of the military. Furthermore, the only way that reformed institutions could operate was if the ones they were replacing were destroyed. Finally, the reforms had to be carefully planned and support assured before they were attempted. It took Mahmud more than a decade to consolidate his power. As first steps in the process of implementing his reforms, he filled the high positions of his administration with young, energetic men loyal to him. He also worked to get the support of the ulama, whose cooperation with the Janissaries had blocked many reform measures in the past. Ulama loyal to the sultan were promoted to high positions, while those who opposed him were dismissed or exiled. Mahmud also followed a careful policy of observing religious traditions and rituals to win over the ulama. By implementing these measures over several years, he was able to destroy the Janissary system and replace them with new army. 15

Mahmud II introduced major changes in the structure of the central government aimed at denigration of the traditional power of the military and religious classes in favor of an ever-expanding bureaucracy made of administrators and scribes centered in the palace and the Sublime Porte where the central government was housed. He also introduced major changes in the provincial administration aimed at building a just system of rule and taxation. According to his new regulations, the tax farmers were to be replaced by salaried agents of the central government called muhassils. Independent financial and military officials answerable to the Istanbul ministries were to supervise the provincial officials. The provincial military garrisons became answerable to Istanbul rather than to the local governors. The new practices were first introduced in the Anatolian provinces as an experimental model for the new system.

The Tanzimat Reforms

Sultan Abdulmajid (1839–1861), who succeeded his father Mahmud II to the throne, faced the serious threat of Egyptian forces under Mehemed-Ali advancing into Anatolia and toward Constantinople. This crisis ended when the European powers intervened and forced Mehemed-Ali to evacuate Syria in return for hereditary rule over Egypt. 16 Under pressure from Britain, Abdulmajid promised to widen and extend the reforms that had begun during his father’s reign. The reforms, called the Tanzimat, were officially proclaimed on November 3, 1839, in a decree (the Decree of Gulhane) signed by the sultan; they were known as the Imperial Rescript. The document consisted of two parts: the protocol (Mazbata), prepared under the guidance of statesman Mustafa Resit at the Sublime Porte; and the sultan’s statement of authorization, the Irade, including his assent to the creation of new institutions that would guarantee his subjects’ security of life, honor, and property; establish a regular system to assess and levy taxes; and develop new methods to ensure a fair system of conscripting, training, and maintaining the soldiers of his armed forces. 17

The Tanzimat created a centralized government administered by the new ruling class, the bureaucrats. The executive and administrative duties of the central government were distributed among functional ministries: The Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, and other ministries and central departments. The power of the provincial governors was weakened, as most of their functions were given to officials sent by and answerable to Istanbul. On February 7, 1840, the old tax system was replaced by standardized cultivation taxes of 10 percent of produce and fixed head taxes on cattle. Other service taxes were all fixed according to the taxpayer’s income and ability to pay. Civilian collectors were sent from Istanbul to assess and collect taxes from each district in return for regular salaries paid by the treasury. Each province was divided into equal units of comparable population and wealth called sanjaqs; each sanjaq was headed by a muhassil. The sanjaqs in turn were subdivided into counties headed by administrators (mudirs). The third step in reducing the autonomous powers of the governors was to provide them with advisory councils composed of representatives of the ruling class as well as the principal subject groups in each area.

The final step in Mustafa Resit’s effort to extend central control into the provinces involved a major reorganization of the army. The exact compliment of each army and the division of its regiments among infantry, cavalry, artillery, and reserves was dependent on local conditions. Soldiers completing their regular service were required to serve in the reserve forces for an additional seven years.

Sultan Abdul Aziz (r. 1861–1876) was interested in modernizing both the army and navy to meet the Russian threat. He purchased large-caliber cannons from Germany to reinforce the defenses of the straits. Starting in 1869, he introduced major military reforms and increased appropriations for the army and navy, which caused additional financial difficulties. During Abdul Aziz’s reign, Mustafa Resit’s original provincial reforms had been modified due to a shortage of trained salaried tax collectors (muhassils) who were supposed to be sent from Istanbul. The local provincial governors were allowed to collect taxes through the local notables. The provincial regulation of 1858 retained the existing structure of the provincial governments, but the governor was made chief authority over all matters and was the sole agent of the central government. The governors’ power over provincial financial activities increased with the abolition of the independent treasurers and scribes sent from Istanbul.

The Tanzimat reforms were characterized politically by the domination of the Porte over the palace. Abdul Aziz had a good opportunity to regain power for the palace after the death of prominent Porte leaders. During the new period of palace power between 1871 and 1874, there was an increase in overall revenue of 20 percent; however, expenditures increased even more. This was caused by Abdul Aziz’s extravagance: buying new warships and rifles, building palaces, and distributing lavish gifts, which led in turn to increased foreign borrowing at exorbitant rates of interest. Sultan Abdul Aziz was an extravagant monarch. His rule was characterized by incompetence, corruption, and dishonesty. He faced serious insurrections in the European provinces of the empire, of which the last was in Bulgaria. In 1876, he was deposed as a result of growing impatience with his corruption and his handling of the Bulgarian uprising, which evoked a storm of protest in Europe. 18

Syria-Palestine under the Ottomans

Almost throughout the nineteenth century, the Palestinian economy was largely rural: most people lived in villages ruled by sheiks, selling agricultural and handicraft products to cities through the trading activity of Bedouins, nomadic people based in the Negev desert. During the Egyptian occupation (1831–1840) by Mehemed-Ali’s son Ibrahim Pasha, land, which had until then mostly collectively owned, began to be concentrated in the hands of large absentee landlords. After the end of the Crimean War (18531856), with the Ottoman Empire already breaking down, a subterranean colonization of Palestine began. This migration was to become more and more definite during the rest of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth: missionaries and investors from European countries brought the traditional life and economy to a turning point. The missionaries were there to proselytize, but they built schools and cultural centers that benefited society. Railways were built, and, especially along the coast, a new type of agricultural cultivation beganno longer subsistence-based, but focused on specialized production (oil, citrus, sesame) for export. Expropriated peasants became laborers or workers, the urban population increased, and throughout society there was a major cultural flourishing: schools (often foreign, for studying languages and modern science) were created, libraries were established, widespread journals and newspapers were published (as late as 1912, the Falastin newspaper was being read in village squares to crowds of still-illiterate peasants), and political participation was active. Due to their high degree of education, the Palestinian bourgeoisie were elites in the Arab political and business world.

While in the early nineteenth century the population of Palestine, impoverished and crushed by taxation, was reduced to a historical minimum (275,000 inhabitants, including 7,000 Jews and 22,000 Christians), by the end of the century it had grown to about 600,000, of which 95 percent were Arabs and 5 percent were Jews (mostly in Jerusalem, where they made up about half of the inhabitants).

After the Crimean war, Palestine witnessed the slow emergence of a classic commercial bourgeoisie in the coastal cities of Jaffa, Haifa, and Acre, and in Jerusalem. This class was composed of Palestinian and Lebanese Christians, Jews, and Europeans who either purchased plots of land directly or acquired land as a result of peasant indebtedness. The emergence of this class was attributed to the growth of the Palestinian economy in the second half of the twentieth century and its gradual incorporation into the European economic system. The major crops of Palestine during this period were wheat, barley, dhura (sorghum), sesame, olive oil, cotton, and oranges. In addition to the agrarian sector, Palestine witnessed an increase in industrial production: soap, cloth, woven linen, pottery, souvenirs. It is estimated that before World War I, there were 1,236 factories and workshops. 19

Administrative Policies in the Ottoman Empire

The major administrative policies that directly affected the Arab population in Syria-Palestine and had long-lasting effects were the millet system, the Tanzimat reforms, and the land laws.

Although the majority of the population of the empire were non-Muslims, only Muslims had access to powerful civilian and military positions. Soon after the conquest of Constantinople, Mehmet II established the millet system, where all subjects of the empire were regarded as belonging to a certain religious community, or millet. Each millet was allowed to maintain its people’s laws and traditions, and each was directed by its own religious leader, who was responsible for civil and religious matters. The millet system gave non-Muslim religious leaders more power over their people than they had had under previous regimes. This policy enabled the various religious communities to live together with the least possible friction while ensuring that the state treasury was the beneficiary of taxes paid by non-Muslims.

In accordance with the Tanzimat laws explained above, Palestine was divided into four sanjaqs. Due to its special religious status, the sanjaq of Jerusalem was created as an independent administrative unit that answered directly to Istanbul. Sanjaq Jerusalem included Jerusalem, Jaffa, Gaza, Hebron, Beersheba, and l­Hafir. Sanjaq Acre in the north included Acre, Haifa, Tiberius, Safad, and Marg ibn Amer; this sanjaq was overseen by Wilayat Beirut. Sanjaq al­Balqa comprised Nablus, Jenin, and Tulkarm, and was also part of Wilayat Beirut. Sanjaq Transjordan con­ sisted of Hauran and Amman; it belonged to Wilayat Damascus. During the late Ottoman period, the sanjaqs of Jerusalem, Nablus, and Acre formed the region commonly known as Palestine. It was the seventh most heavily populated region of the Ottoman Empire’s thirty­six provinces.

The Land Law of 1858

The Land Law of 1858 was aimed at providing the central government the power to control the state land and the growth of large private-land ownership. Its intent was to reassert state ownership over the imperial possessions, which over the centuries had passed out of government control, and to gain more revenues for its treasury through collecting taxes on title deeds.

The new regulations required all the land and property to be surveyed according to the new laws; each person or institution claiming ownership was required to prove its legitimacy with legal documents before it could be given a new ownership deed. However, the government failed to achieve its purpose behind this law.

The fellahin (agricultural laborers) avoided registering their lands in their names so that they could evade paying the title taxes. For this reason and others, they registered their title deeds in the name of deceased relatives or wealthy urban or rural families. This led to the accumulation of the land in the hands of wealthy notables, who were able to use the new law to increase their power. Using false documents to prove their claims, extending their rights to include the sale of such properties to others, leaving them to distant relatives, or auctioning them off to the highest bidders, wealthy individuals and their families were able to control larger and larger private estates. These evasions were sanctioned or overlooked by officials who were willing to accept the financial advantages that went with cooperation.

Moreover, with the introduction of new legal codes and new taxation procedures, the government needed help from the elite to assist the local governors and to act as intermediaries between the government and the local population. Thus the central government was unable to control the tax collection process through its local authorities. The main beneficiaries of the land laws were the influential family chiefs who assumed full control over the tax collection process. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many fellahin who had borrowed money from the wealthy elite were compelled to sell them their land. However, they had to continue cultivating it with the obligation to hand over a fixed percentage of the produce to the new owners.

A total of 250 families in Palestine owned about 414,300 hectares. The Ottoman government benefited only from the sale of state land to wealthy families. In 1869, the Butros, Sursuq, Tuwayni, and Farah Lebanese families purchased from the Ottoman government the land of seventeen villages in Marj ibn Emir for as little as twenty thousand British pounds. In 1872, the Sursuq family had about 23,000 hectares and a population of four thousand peasants in the neighborhood of Nazareth and Marj ibn Emir. Most of the Palestinian lands acquired by Zionist settlers in the late part of the nineteenth century were purchased from these Lebanese families.

The 1858 Land Law had drastic repercussions on the fellahin and contributed to their land being confiscated by the British during the British mandate of Palestine, and subsequently in the takeover and occupation of Palestine by Israel in 1948 and 1967, as the Palestinian fellah (farmers) were unable to prove ownership of their ancestral lands.

Abdul Hamid Takes Power

Abdul Hamid II (1876–1909) came to the throne in 1876, at the youthful age of thirty-four, after Sultan Abdul Aziz was deposed. Abdul Hamid was confronted with serious problems when he took office as the new ruler of the Ottoman Empire: a spirit of insurrection in the empire’s European territories, the threat of war with Russia, a hostile and demanding Europe, limited financial resources and a treasury in default. Initially, Abdul Hamid enjoyed a reputation as a liberal-minded and progressive prince. The European powers were expecting him to introduce major reforms in the provincial administration. Progressive Ottoman activists, led by Midhat Pasha, were demanding the introduction of constitutional government. Abdul Hamid was a talented and wily politician; he knew what initiatives need to be introduced in order to assure the European leaders and the Ottoman progressive groups. On December 23, 1876, the very day on which the European leaders were assembling in conference to draw up their demands from the sultan, he stole their thunder by appointing Midhat Pasha, the governor of Baghdad, as grand vizier and authorizing a new constitution. This constitution, created under the guidance of Midhat Pasha, eliminated the autocratic power of the sultan and stated that all Ottoman objects, regardless of race, were equal. Abdul Hamid’s action answered the concerns of the European conference, as well as the empire’s subjects; at first, his initiatives brought the adulation of his people. However, he did not intend to fulfill his promises; he was only trying to prevent his opponents from taking any action that might undermine his authority. Early in February 1877, Abdul Hamid abruptly dismissed Midhat Pasha and exiled him to FranceThen, in March of the same year, he suspended the new constitution. His justification for these actions was Russia’s declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire. The constitution remained suspended for thirty-one years. 20

The Russian–Turkish war of 1877 ended with the advancement of the Russian army toward the outskirts of Constantinople. The sultan was forced to sign the onerous Treaty of San Stepheno; however, thanks to British intervention, this agreement was replaced by the Treaty of Berlin in July of 1878. With the conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin and the suspension of the constitution, an era of tyranny, corruption and abuse of power began. The administrative reorganization of the empire that had been passed during the reigns of Abdul Magid and Abdul Aziz was amended to give the sultan a greater degree of control.

Abdul Hamid’s rule was a dictatorship enforced by repression and censorship. The sultan’s government strictly controlled publications and journalism and silenced critical voices. Spies were planted in all corners of the empire in order to identify and crush any opposition. The court system became a tool of harsh punishment through detention or exile. As for the economy, Abdul Hamid followed policies that led the country to bankruptcy. He mortgaged the main resources of the empire to obtain money that he spent unwisely. He devoted a large share of the borrowed money to reorganize and equip the army. He spent vast sums of money on military training and education, while public education was ignored.

Since 1517, the Ottoman sultans had claimed the title of caliph and presented themselves as the protectors of the holy places of Islam in Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem. Abdul Hamid realized the value of this title, and worked hard to take the greatest advantage of religion. His plan was to restore the caliphate to its proper position in his sultanate by utilizing the achievements of the Muslim reformers, especially the movement of pan-Islamicist Jamal al­din al­Afghani, 21 whose teachings he claimed to follow. His goal was to strengthen the position of the sultanate in the minds of the empire’s subjects as well as among the millions of Muslims abroad. He was very strict in practicing the religious observances, and strongly discouraged the habits of drunkenness that previous sultans had indulged in the palace. He surrounded himself with theologians and holy men of wide renown and influence. A college was founded for the training of missionaries who were sent to other lands of Islam to preach the good tidings of the caliph. Subsidies to theological schools and colleges, within the empire and abroad, were provided. He spent large sums of money on the repair and decoration of the mosques of Mecca, Madina, and Jerusalem.

Such policies earned him the support of the non-Turkish Muslims (the Turkish masses of Anatolia were by nature loyal to the sultan). To further bolster support from non-Turkish Muslims, he showered bounties on Arab learning institutions and Arab chiefs and dignitaries. He appointed Arabs into his own personal service at the palace and prominent government positions. He surrounded himself with an aristocracy of religious dignitaries. Abu al-Huda al-Ṣayyadi, an Alephite Sufi, rallied influential religious leaders behind Sultan Abdul Hamid’s claim to the caliphate and his ideology of Islamism. Wherever his policy of favor failed, the sultan used harsh measures to suppress opposing groups and individuals. Prominent opposition figures were exiled. Family quarrels and tribal disputes were exploited. He subsidized agents to provoke disturbances in order to provide an apparent pretext for the punishment of his opponents. In certain situations, he arranged assassinations.

Arabs of special status were invited to reside in Constantinople. One of those guests was Husayn ibn Ali, a descendant of the Bani Hashem (Hashemite), the noblest of all Arab families. Husayn was courteously invited to bring his household and come to reside in Constantinople. He arrived in 1893 with his wife and three sons: Ali, Abdullah, and Faysal. This turned into a captivity that lasted more than fifteen years. 22

The most important undertaking during Abdul Hamid’s reign was the construction of the Hijaz railway line from Damascus to Madina and on to Mecca, which aimed to facilitate the pilgrimage. An appeal to the Muslim world was issued, stressing the pious motives which had inspired the caliph to build the railway, and asking for contributions toward the costs. Wealthy Muslims responded generously and provided most of the funding for the project. A special tax in the form of a stamp duty was levied throughout the empire. German engineers began their work in the spring of 1901, and by the autumn of 1908 the line reached Madina, a distance of close to fifteen hundred kilometers, at a cost of three million pounds. This project was of great political and strategic value, evoking a great deal of enthusiasm throughout the entire Muslim world. It added greatly to the prestige of the caliphate. Strategically, it provided Abdul Hamid with a much-needed means of overland transport of his troops into and from Arabia, at no cost to his treasury. Before the line became operational, a fast caravan took forty days to travel from Damascus to Madina; with the railway, the trip took a mere five days.

Germany and the Ottomans

The Germans were interested in establishing an alliance with the Ottomans, and, through them, with the Islamic world. Abdul Hamid also was interested in building an alliance with Germany, recognizing the value of an ally of that caliber in the councils of Europe. In 1883 a German military mission headed by Colonel von der Goltz arrived in Constantinople to transform the Turkish army into a strong, efficient machine. The most important achievement was the establishment of military colleges, whose high standards attracted many of the best brains of the new generation of both Arabs and Turks. Graduates of those military colleges went on to play an important part in the revolution which overthrew Abdul Hamid’s tyranny, as well as in the Arab revolt a few years later.

The Ottomans began placing orders for arms and munitions with German firms. Agents of financial institutions and powerful banks arrived in Constantinople between 1888 and 1896 to secure concessions for railways in Anatolia that would connect the existing line from Haidar Pasha on the Asiatic shore of the Bosporus down to Konia and the Persian Gulf. This railway was intended to extend eastward to Mosul and then turn southward to Baghdad and down to Basra, ending somewhere on the Persian Gulf, with branch lines that would provide direct communication between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. 23

In the autumn of 1898, Kaiser Wilhelm II arrived in Constantinople on a state visit to the sultan. From Constantinople he went to Jerusalem and Damascus. During his visit, he delivered a speech in Damascus in which he stated that the sultan and the 300 million Muslims who revered him as caliph could rest assured that they would always have a friend in the German emperor. Then, with great ceremony, he laid a wreath on the tomb of Saladin and ordered that a silver lamb be made for the mausoleum to demonstrate his enormous personal admiration for the Muslim hero. 24

The Coup by the CUP

Abdul Hamid’s reign ended on July 23, 1908, when a revolution of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), a secret association of army officers—graduates of the military colleges mentioned above—forced him to restore the constitution that had been suspended for thirty-one years. On the following day, he abolished censorship, released his political prisoners, and dismissed his army of thirty thousand spies.

One of the first measures taken by the CUP was the appointment of Sharif Husayn ibn Ali to replace the ruling grand sharif of Mecca. The members of the CUP were of different races; the majority were Turkish officers, with Jews coming in second. The party included only a few Arab army officers. The constitution of 1908 was Midhat Pasha’s project of 1876 with its old imperfections; however, it was received with rejoicing and enthusiasm. The fact that the constitution named Turkish as the official language of the empire negated the announcement that all races of the state were equal.

The actions of the CUP during the process of the election of the parliament reflected their intent for the Turks to control the country. The 245­member Chamber of Deputies assembled in December 1908 was composed of 150 Turks and only sixty Arabs, a ratio of five to two to the advantage of the Turks. In the senate, which numbered forty members appointed by the sultan, there were only three Arabs. 25

On April 13, 1909, the troops forming the garrison of Constantinople revolted on behalf of Abdul Hamid, aiming to overthrow the CUP. This revolt was short-lived; an Arab officer marched from Salonica to the capital and restored the CUP’s author­ ity. Three days later, the senate and the chamber announced the deposition of Abdul Hamid and proclaimed his brother Reshad, who took the name of Mehmet V, as the new sultan. With his accession, the CUP had absolute control over the empire, and they established a new tyranny, adopting a policy of asserting Turkish nationalism. The diversity of races within the empire called for a decentralized form of government, which should have given Arabs and other non-Turkish provinces a large measure of home rule and the freedom to pursue their political and cultural development as autonomous members of the empire. However, the new regime adopted a policy of centralization. One of their first acts was to ban societies founded by non-Turkish racial groups. Among these was the Al­Ikha’ al­Arabi, which eight months before had been inaugurated at an impassioned meeting of Arabs and Turks.

Footnotes

  1. Vernon O. Egger, A History of the Muslim World to 1750: The Making of a Civilization, second edition (Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge, 2017), 166–167.
  2. Egger, A History of the Muslim World to 1750, 303.
  3. Muhammad Y. Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 19–20.
  4. Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism, 37–41.
  5. Egger, A History of the Muslim World to 1750, 357–358.
  6. Egger, A History of the Muslim World to 1750, 355.
  7. Egger, A History of the Muslim World to 1750, 359.
  8. Egger, A History of the Muslim World to 1750, 368.
  9. Egger, A History of the Muslim World to 1750, 368–371.
  10. Algeria was lost in 1880, Tunis in 1881, both to France; Libya, the last Ottoman territory in Africa, was lost to Italy in 1911.
  11. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1939), 21–22.
  12. M. Şükrü Haniogˇlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 15–16.
  13. Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 24.
  14. Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 55–60.
  15. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 1–25.
  16. His line of descendants continued to rule in Egypt until 1952, when the Egyptian army took over in a coup d’état and established the Republic of Egypt under Gamal Abdul Nasser (1918–1970).
  17. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 55–60.
  18. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 153–156.
  19. Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism, 37–45.
  20. Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 61–63.
  21. Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 68–70.
  22. Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 72; Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism, 49–53.
  23. Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 75–77.
  24. Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 76–77.
  25. Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 104.

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